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ABSTRACT. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Supreme Court backed away from affording women the highest level of
constitutional protection for the abortion choice, but nonetheless promised to
preserve Roe v. Wade's core objectives by instituting the undue burden
standard for measuring the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion. In the
years following the Casey decision, states and the federal government have
added more and more restrictions on women's access to abortion. This Article
asks whether Casey's undue burden standard has meaningfully protected a
woman's right to an abortion.
The Article begins by describing the undue burden standard's development
and application, from pre-Casey decisions to the Casey joint opinion. Part III
describes the Supreme Court's clarification and application of the standard in
its subsequent abortion decisions. Part IV reviews the ways in which lower
courts have implemented the undue burden standard, concluding that, if
correctly and fairly applied, the Casey standard can provide meaningful
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protection for the abortion right. The Article ends with recommendations for
solidifying and clarifying the undue burden standard, which will ensure that
Roe's core is preserved as promised in Casey.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifteen years have passed since the United States Supreme Court's
historic decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.1 As litigators for Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania and other Pennsylvania reproductive
health care providers in the Casey litigation, we had awaited the day of the
decision with foreboding. Fully prepared for a wholesale overruling of Roe v.
Wade that would sanction the recriminalization of abortion, instead we greeted
the Casey decision with a mixture of surprise, relief, and uncertainty.
While the Supreme Court discarded the highly protective strict scrutiny
standard of Roe,2 the Casey joint opinion nevertheless preserved the core of
Roe by adopting the undue burden test to measure the constitutionality of
restrictions on abortion. 3 This new standard was arduous enough to sustain a
facial challenge to two of the restrictive provisions challenged in Casey--the
Pennsylvania law's husband-notification requirement4 and its related reporting
provision -and to raise concerns about the constitutionality of others, despite
the limited record before the Court. 6 That this new standard was meant to offer
meaningful protection for women is further supported by the joint opinion's
passionate discussion of the benefits that reproductive liberty had bestowed
upon generations of women and their prospects for full equality.
7
As with any new test, however, the undue burden standard would have to
be applied in subsequent cases before its full contours became clear. In the
years following the Casey decision, state legislatures, as well as the federal
government, have added more restrictions on women's access to abortion.
8
These laws, now subject to review under the Casey standard, include
mandatory waiting periods, 9 informed consent scripts that force doctors to give
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 ("Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb
the central holding of Roe v. Wade and we reaffirm that holding."). The lead opinion in Casey was a rare
joint opinion coauthored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined in those parts of the opinion that reaffirmed Roe's essential tenets and invalidated the husband-
notification provision of the Pennsylvania law and its related reporting requirement. See generally infra
Part II.B (discussing the Caseyjoint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe).
4. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98.
5. Id. at 901.
6. See generally infra Part II.C (discussing the Casey joint opinion's application of the undue
burden standard to the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania law).
7. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
8. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, between 1992 and 2005, states enacted 299 laws
restricting abortion. Memorandum from Elizabeth Nash, Pub. Policy Assoc., Alan Guttmacher Inst.
(Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with the authors). In contrast, between 1985 and 1991, states enacted only sixty-
eight abortion restrictions. Id.
9. Mandatory waiting periods have proliferated across the United States in the years following
Casey. Although these laws were on the books in approximately thirteen states prior to Casey, they were
not being enforced because they had been ruled constitutionally invalid in 1983. See Terry Sollom, State
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their patients information biased against abortion,10 onerous licensing and
regulatory schemes for abortion providers,"l detailed reporting requirements,'
2
consent and notification requirements for minors,' 3 abortion procedure bans,
14
and laws making abortion providers strictly liable for any and all damage to
their clients. 15 In the first four months of 2006 alone, legislators in fourteen
Legislation on Reproductive Health in 1992: What Was Proposed and Enacted, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 87, 88. At the end of 1992, only two states enforced mandatory waiting periods, but
forty-one counseling or waiting period bills were introduced in twenty-four states. Id. By August 1994,
fifteen states had laws imposing waiting periods and seven states were enforcing them. See Frances A.
Althaus & Stanley K. Henshaw, The Effects of Mandatory Delay Laws on Abortion Patients and
Providers, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 228, 228. Twenty-four states now require women
to listen to state-prescribed information and then wait for a specified period of time, usually twenty-four
hours, before the abortion procedure is performed. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN
OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS 1 (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spibOAL.pdf. In six of these states, the laws require that the state-mandated information always be
provided to women in person, thereby necessitating two visits to the abortion provider. Id.
10. Twenty-eight states require women to receive state-prescribed counseling biased against
abortion before an abortion procedure. Id. As part of the counseling, three of these states force providers
to tell women about the purported link between abortion and breast cancer; four states require
information on the fetus's purported ability to feel pain; and three states require that women be warned
about the possible long-term mental health consequences of having an abortion. Id. These laws are
consistent with a concerted strategy on the part of abortion opponents to cast abortion as harmful to
women, and to cast abortion restrictions as "pro-woman" legislation necessary to protect women's
health. See generally DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE (1996) (arguing for a
comprehensive "pro-woman/pro-life" initiative, including legislation, public education, and research,
that focuses on the purported harmful effects of abortion on women).
11. Thirty-three states have laws burdening abortion providers with restrictions not applied to other
comparable medical providers. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF
WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION
PROVIDERS (TRAP), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in-your--state/who-decides/
nationwide-trends/issues-trap.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). These laws, referred to by opponents as
TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws, commonly require doctors to acquire licenses
and restrict abortion services to hospitals or specialized facilities. Id.
12. Forty-six states require abortion providers to submit regular and confidential reports to the state.
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE ABORTION POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1
(2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibARR.pdf. Three states and the District of
Columbia collect this information on a voluntary basis. Id.
13. Forty-three states have enacted laws that require parental involvement if a minor decides to
have an abortion; in nine of those states, enforcement is enjoined because of constitutional defects in the
laws. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE ABORTION POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN
MINORS' ABORTIONS 2 (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibPIMA.pdf.
14. Thirty-one states have enacted criminal prohibitions against an array of abortion procedures
commonly used in the second-trimester of pregnancy, often mislabeled by the bills' proponents as
"partial-birth" abortions. See Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Briefing Paper: So-Called "Partial-Birth
Abortion " Ban Legislation, By State (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/
pub.bp.pba bystate.pdf [hereinafter Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Briefing Paper].
15. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (2006) (imposing civil liability on abortion
providers for any injury to the woman or fetus, and making certain laws governing medical malpractice,
including limitations of liability, inapplicable). See generally Jennifer L. Achilles, Comment, Using Tort
Law to Circumvent Roe v. Wade and Other Pesky Due Process Decisions: An Examination of
Louisiana's Act 825, 78 TUL. L. REV. 853 (2004) (analyzing the Louisiana law imposing tort liability on
abortion providers); A.J. Stone III, Comment, Consti-tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around Abortion
Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 474 (2000)
(examining the impact of abortion tort liability laws on women's right to abortion).
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states proposed measures to ban virtually all abortion procedures,' 6 and the
South Dakota legislature passed, but voters rejected, the nation's first post-
Casey abortion ban.' 7 As governmental restrictions have mounted, the number
of abortion providers in the United States has continued to decline.' 8 Three
states-North Dakota, Mississippi, and South Dakota-now have only one
abortion provider in the entire state.' 9 In these and many other states, women
must travel long distances to reach a provider.
20
With the highly visible confirmation hearings of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito still fresh in the nation's memory and the federal Abortion21 22
Procedure Ban21 undergoing Supreme Court review, much media attention is
fixated on whether the newly constituted Court will overrule Roe.23 Some
16. E-mail from Elizabeth Nash to authors (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with the authors); see
GUTTMACHER INST., MONTHLY STATE UPDATE: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html#bans (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
17. 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 119, H.B. 1215, 81st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006) (imposing
criminal ban on abortions except when necessary to preserve the woman's life). The South Dakota bill
was signed into law by Governor Mike Rounds in March 2006 and was scheduled to take effect on July
1, 2006, but a successful petition drive halted its implementation and secured a statewide vote on its
validity. Gretchen Ruethling, South Dakota: Certification for Abortion Plan Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2006, at Al 5. On November 7, 2006, a majority of voters in South Dakota rejected the ban. Monica
Davey, South Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at PI. On June 17,
2006, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco signed into law a criminal ban on all abortions except those
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life. 2006 La. Acts 467. Unlike South Dakota's abortion ban,
the Louisiana law becomes effective upon the reversal of Roe v. Wade by the United States Supreme
Court or the adoption of a federal constitutional amendment allowing bans on abortion. Id.
18. The number of abortion providers in the United States declined from 2380 providers in 1992 to
1819 providers in 2000, a twenty-four percent decrease. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw,
Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 6, 10 (2003). During the same period, the number of abortions reported in the United States
also declined, but at a substantially lower rate than the decline in the number of providers. Id. at 9
(noting that the number of reported abortions in the United States declined fifteen percent between 1992
and 2000, from 1,528,930 to 1,312,990).
19. Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Makes Abortion Rare Through Laws and Stigma, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
2005, at AOl.
20. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 18, at 10-11 (noting that in 2000, 87% of the counties in the
United States had no abortion provider; "94% of all providers and 99% of those who performed 400 or
more abortions" are located in metropolitan areas); see also Nieves, supra note 19 (noting that some
women in South Dakota must travel 350 miles each way to the sole provider in the state: "For some
women, the only way to do it-and not pay for a hotel room--is to make the 700-mile trip in one day").
21. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
22. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382) (invalidating the federal Abortion Procedure Ban on grounds that
it lacks a health exception, imposes an undue burden, and is unconstitutionally vague); Carhart v.
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (striking down the same statute because it does not provide an
exception for circumstances in which the procedure is necessary to protect the health of women seeking
abortions), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (No. 05-380); see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the statute violates due process rights of physicians
and patients because it lacks a health exception).
23. See, e.g., Stephen Henderson & James Kuhnhenn, Alito Holds His Ground on 'Roe,' PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 12, 2006, at AI (describing the efforts of Democratic senators to press Samuel A. Alito
to clarify his position on whether Roe v. Wade is settled law); Charles Lane, Nominee's Reasoning
Points to a Likely Vote Against Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A6 (concluding that
supporters and skeptics believe that Samuel A. Alito "would probably vote to strike down Roe");
Shannon McCaffrey, Roberts Faces Test on Abortion, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 22, 2005, at Al ("Abortion
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commentators suggest an alternative scenario, in which the Court will instead
"incremental ly] eviscerat[e]" Roe by applying the Casey undue burden
standard to permit so many restrictions on the abortion right that soon only a
privileged few will be able to exercise it.24 Yet the Casey plurality's broad
articulation of the standard, its application of the standard to the challenged
provisions, and the expansive rhetoric of women's equality in which it couched
the joint opinion all support the notion that the Casey Court indeed intended to
preserve the core of Roe and not merely an empty shell.
Has the undue burden standard meaningfully protected a woman's right to
an abortion? This Article analyzes the application of the Casey standard
nationwide over the past decade-and-a-half to assess the current status of the
constitutional protection it offers. Part II describes the development and
application of the undue burden standard in the Casey litigation, focusing on
the evolution of the standard from its narrow articulation in pre-Casey
decisions and the court of appeals' opinion in Casey to its broader definition in
the Casey plurality opinion. Part III describes the Supreme Court's clarification
and application of the standard in its subsequent abortion decisions: Mazurek v.
25 26 2Armstrong, Stenberg v. Carhart, and Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood.2 7 Part
IV reviews the ways in which lower courts have implemented the undue burden
standard in a variety of contexts, including challenges to mandatory waiting
periods, state-scripted counseling provisions, licensing and regulatory schemes
for abortion facilities, and bans on certain types of abortion procedures. This
Part examines lower courts' contrasting approaches to applying the Casey
standard to assess whether a given restriction has "the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice ... ,28 The Article ends
with recommendations for solidifying and clarifying the undue burden standard
so as to ensure Roe's core is preserved as promised in Casey. Application of
Casey by some lower courts demonstrates that, if correctly and fairly applied,
the undue burden standard can provide meaningful protection for the abortion
right. While the Roberts Court could discard Casey altogether, if it keeps the
undue burden test in place, the Article concludes that the Court must provide
was emerging as the pivotal issue of Supreme Court nominee John G. Roberts Jr.'s confirmation battle
as lawmakers and advocates on both sides of the aisle tried to read between the lines yesterday to
determine whether he would work to overturn Roe v. Wade.").
24. Dawn Johnsen, The Outer Shell: The Hollowing Out of Roe v. Wade, SLATE, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2134849; see, e.g., Larry Eichel, The Staying Power of'Roe v. Wade,' PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 31, 2005, at C3 ("'I can't imagine Roe ever being explicitly overruled, although I can
see it being narrowed to the point that it has no teeth in it."') (quoting Professor Marci A. Hamilton),
available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/specialpackages/sunday-review/12264941 .htm;
Robin Toner & Adam Liptak, In New Court, Roe May Stand, So Foes Look to Limit Its Scope, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at Al ("[E]ven without overturning Roe, the new court could seriously limit the
decision's reach and change the way abortions are regulated around the country, experts say.").
25. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
26. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
27. 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
28. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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the guidance that lower courts and litigants need to ensure that the standard
offers meaningful protection to women.
II. THE MEANING OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD: ITS EVOLUTION IN
CASEY
Prior to the Casey decision in 1992, "undue burden" terminology had
appeared in some of the Supreme Court's abortion opinions,29 and Justice
O'Connor had championed the use of an undue burden analysis in several of
her dissenting opinions.30 The Casey joint opinion, however, crafted an entirely
new undue burden analysis and, for the first time, made it the controlling
standard for evaluating all abortion restrictions. The meaning of this new
standard can only fully be understood first by contrasting it with Justice
O'Connor's initial formulations of undue burden, and second by analyzing how
the Casey joint opinion defined, developed, and actually applied the standard.
This Part undertakes that analysis and concludes that, although the Casey
plurality backed away from affording women the highest level of constitutional
protection for the abortion choice and stumbled in its efforts to adequately
clarify the contours of the undue burden standard, the plurality nonetheless
intended to provide a level of protection for the abortion right that was fully
consistent with Roe's core objective of "ensur[ing] that the woman's right to
choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life
that her choice exists in theory but not in fact."
31
29. The Court had used an "undue burden" analysis in cases involving restrictions on minors'
access to abortion. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) ("A requirement of
written consent... is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.");
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I/), 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (holding that a state court's construction of
Massachusetts's parental consent law "would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of
the right to seek an abortion"). The phrase "undue burden" had also appeared in cases involving
restrictions on access to public funding. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (citing
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)); Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (stating that a woman is protected
from "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy"); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2036-37 (1994) (arguing that the term "undue
burden" was not developed as a formal standard and was not used in these cases as a substitute for the
Roe standard).
30. Justice O'Connor first argued for an undue burden standard in her dissenting opinions in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 461-64 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting), and Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 505 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), decided the same day as Akron I. She continued her advocacy for such a
standard three years later in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 828-29 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490, 529-30 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part), and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). For detailed analyses of the development of the undue burden
standard in Justice O'Connor's opinions, see Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion
Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989), and Metzger, supra note 29, at
2036-37.
31. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
A. The Journey to the Supreme Court in the Casey Litigation
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the restrictions on abortion that were
challenged in Casey in direct response to signals that an emerging conservative
Supreme Court majority was poised to overrule Roe v. Wade. After years of
applying Roe's strict scrutiny standard to strike down most abortion
restrictions, 32 "the constitutional tide turned' 33 in 1989 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.34 In declaring
three Missouri abortion restrictions to be constitutional, a plurality of the Court
called for a "reconsideration" 35 of Roe's trimester framework 36 and reviewed
32. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572-73 (15th ed.
2004) (describing abortion cases decided between Roe and Casey and noting that, other than denials of
public funding, the Supreme Court struck down most abortion restrictions). As the composition of the
Supreme Court began changing in the early 1980s, skepticism about the Roe trimester framework
increased. See, e.g., Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 461-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (urging that the Roe trimester
framework be replaced by an undue burden standard); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828-29 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (restating her undue burden analysis).
33. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 24 (2d ed. 1992). For detailed
discussions of the changes in the composition of the Supreme Court during the 1980s, the political
strategies that led to those changes, and how the Court's new composition affected its support for Roe v.
Wade, see DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE 637-80 (1998), and TRIBE, supra, at 17-20.
34. 492 U.S. 490. The Missouri law declared that life begins at conception, required testing for
viability at twenty weeks' gestational age, and banned the use of public employees and facilities for
performing abortions. Id. at 501. Webster marked the first occasion on which Justice Antonin Scalia,
appointed by President Reagan in 1986, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, appointed by President Reagan
in 1988, participated in the Supreme Court's review of abortion restrictions. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 20.
These two new Justices joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and White in voting to
uphold all of the challenged provisions of the Missouri law. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.
35. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that "the rigid trimester
analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe has... [made] constitutional law in this area a
virtual Procrustean bed" and urging "reconsideration" of the trimester framework because it had proven
"unsound in principle and unworkable in practice") (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)); id. at 521 (concluding that the case before the Court offered "no
occasion to revisit the holding of Roe," thus leaving it "undisturbed," but acknowledging that, "[t]o the
extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases"). In contrast,
Justice Scalia urged that Roe be overruled "explicitly." Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice
O'Connor, the critical fifth vote to uphold the Missouri provisions, declined to reconsider Roe v. Wade,
arguing that the statute could be upheld under the standards of Roe and its progeny and that any
reconsideration of Roe was inappropriate. Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("Unlike the
plurality, I do not understand these viability testing requirements to conflict with any of the Court's past
decisions concerning state regulation of abortion. Therefore, there is no necessity to accept the State's
invitation to reexamine the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade .... Where there is no need to decide
a constitutional question, it is a venerable principle of this Court's adjudicatory processes not to do
so .... "). For an excellent critique of the Webster decision, see Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling,
Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989).
36. Roe developed the trimester framework as a means of accommodating competing interests of
the woman and the state. Under the trimester framework, almost no restrictions were permitted during
the first-trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). During the second-trimester, the government
could "regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health," but not to
further the State's interest in potential life. See id. at 164. During the third-trimester, subsequent to fetal
viability, the government could prohibit abortions entirely except if necessary to save the life or health
of the pregnant woman. Id. at 164-65.
[Vol. 18:2
2006] Preserving the Core of Roe
the Missouri law only to determine whether it was "reasonably designed" to
advance a "legitimate" state interest.37 In an impassioned dissenting opinion,
Justice Blackmun lamented that the plurality had effectively "invite[d] every
state legislature to enact more and more restrictive abortion regulations...
[that] will return the law of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that
generally prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973." 38
State legislatures agreed with Justice Blackmun's reading of the Webster
opinion and accepted the plurality's invitation to enact new restrictions on
abortion. In the months after Webster, two states and the territory of Guam re-
enacted pre-Roe criminal bans on virtually all abortions. 39 In 1988 and again in
the fall of 1989, the Pennsylvania legislature chose a different strategy,
amending its comprehensive Abortion Control Act to add a series of highly
intrusive and burdensome restrictions on abortion that fell short of outright
bans. The new provisions required that: (1) physicians recite a prescribed litany
of information discouraging abortion and describe the availability of state-
sponsored, printed materials offering alternatives, and then delay their patient's
procedure for at least twenty-four hours; 40 (2) married women notify their
husbands of their abortion decision;4 ' (3) young women under the age of
37. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
38. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 560 ("For today, at least, the law of abortion stands
undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the
signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows.").
39. In 1990, Guam passed a law banning nearly all abortions, as well as counseling, encouraging,
or advising a woman to obtain an abortion. GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 31.20-.22, 31.33 (1990). In 1990,
Louisiana attempted to revive its pre-Roe law subjecting physicians to ten years of hard labor for
performing abortions. Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990) (invalidating the Louisiana
abortion ban because it was in conflict with abortion regulations enacted subsequent to the ban). In
1991, after that attempt failed, the Louisiana legislature passed a law banning abortion except where the
procedure was necessary to preserve the woman's life, the pregnancy was the result of reported rape or
incest, or to preserve the life or health of the fetus or to remove "a dead unborn child." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:87 (1991 & Supp. 1992). In January 1991, Utah amended and re-enacted its pre-Roe felony
criminal abortion ban. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (2006) (stating that abortions prior to twenty
weeks' gestational age can only be performed to save a woman's life, in cases of rape or incest if
reported to law enforcement, to avert grave damage to the woman's medical health or to prevent the
"birth of a child" with "grave defects"; abortions after twenty weeks' gestational age can only be
performed to save the woman's life, to avert grave damage to the woman's medical health or to prevent
the "birth of a child" with "grave defects"). Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Casey, these bans
were invalidated and never went into effect. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
40. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3208 (West 2000). Consent is "informed" only when a
physician provides the woman with information about the nature of the abortion procedure, its risks and
alternative treatments, the probable gestational age of the fetus, and the medical risks of carrying the
pregnancy to term. Id. § 3205. Additionally, these provisions mandate that physicians or counselors
offer the pregnant woman materials that give detailed descriptions and pictures of the fetus at two-week
gestational increments from fertilization until full-term, as well as the names of agencies offering
alternatives to abortion; and inform the woman of the availability of medical assistance benefits for
prenatal care and childbirth and of the father's liability for child support if she carried the pregnancy to
term. Id. §§ 3205, 3208.
41. Id. § 3209. Section 3209 exempted those women who could provide an alternative signed
statement certifying that her husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her husband could not be
located; that the pregnancy is the result of spousal sexual assault which she had reported to law
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eighteen have either the consent of one parent or a court order prior to an
abortion, and that both the young woman and her parent obtain the state
mandated information discouraging the abortion;42 and (4) clinics report
detailed, particularized information about every abortion patient to the state.43
The amendments also severely narrowed the Act's existing definition of the
"medical emergency" situations that would exempt women from complying
with the forced waiting period, biased counseling, parental consent, and
husband-notification requirements. 44 Significantly, the amendments explicitly
reenacted many of the very statutory provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Act,
which the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists just a few years earlier.45 As their
chief legislative architect and sponsor admitted, the new amendments were
explicitly and unabashedly designed to trigger a challenge to Roe v. Wade that
would lead to its overturning and a return to criminal bans on abortion.
46
enforcement; or that the woman believes that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to
inflict bodily injury upon her. Id.
42. Id. §§ 3205, 3206 (West 2000).
43. Id. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a) & (f) (West 2000). Section 3214(a)(12) required the reporting of a
married woman's "reason for failure to provide notice" to her husband. Id. § 3214(a)(12).
44. Id. § 3203 (West 2000) (narrowly defining medical emergency as a condition so dangerous "as
to necessitate the immediate abortion of [the] pregnancy to avert [the woman's] death or for which a
delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function").
45. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking
down, inter alia, Pennsylvania's "informed consent" requirements and regulations mandating the filing
of detailed reports that were made available to the public); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down, inter alia, Ohio's "informed consent" and
mandatory 24-hour waiting period provisions). Following Akron I, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
conceded the invalidity of certain provisions of the Act, including the 24-hour mandatory delay and
physician-only counseling provisions. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737
F.2d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, the constitutionality of those provisions was not before the Supreme
Court in Thornburgh. For a thorough summary of the history of abortion regulation in Pennsylvania, see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1326-28 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
46. See, e.g., Stephen Freind, Pennsylvania's Response to Webster: A Strategy for Further
Challenging Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION AND THE STATES: POLITICAL CHANGE AND FUTURE
REGULATION 309, 310-11 (Jane B. Wishner, ABA ed., ABA 1993) ("We.. . see these bills as
opportunities to go to the U.S. Supreme Court and give the Court an opportunity to challenge Roe v.
Wade and now Webster .... We interpreted the Court's ruling in Webster as saying that the states can
have additional regulation of abortion, and even in some cases outlaw abortions, if there is a rational
basis for doing so. We looked at Webster as a window of opportunity, and we were determined to crawl
through that window as quickly as possible.") (footnotes omitted); Memorandum from Stephen F.
Freind to Members of Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Sept. 27, 1989) (on file with the authors)
(identifying one of the purposes of 1989 Abortion Control Act as being to trigger judicial overruling of
Roe v. Wade); see also Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1372-73 ("The hostility of Pennsylvania's legislature to
the protection of a woman's right of privacy to choose abortion is apparent from the history of the
legislation purporting to regulate abortion in Pennsylvania .... This hostility is equally apparent in the
1988 and 1989 amendments .... Clearly, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania seeks to challenge the
very foundation of Thornburgh and those cases that preceded it, including Roe v. Wade.").
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In the ensuing facial challenge47 to the Pennsylvania restrictions, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania defended the constitutionality of the new law
by arguing that the courts should apply the undue burden concept developed by
Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinions in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health and Thornburgh or, alternatively, overturn Roe v.
Wade wholesale.4 8 Relying principally on Roe, Thornburgh, and Akron, and
following a three-day bench trial, the district court enjoined virtually all of the
challenged restrictions, explicitly rejecting the Commonwealth's effort to avoid
the Roe strict scrutiny standard.4 9 In stark contrast, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services50  and subsequent opinions had eliminated Roe's strict scrutiny
standard.5 1 Applying Marks v. United States,52 the court of appeals took the
unusual step of construing Webster and Hodgson as establishing a new standard
of review under which to judge the constitutionality of all abortion
restrictions-Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard.53 Applying that
standard as then formulated by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinions,
54
the court of appeals held that all challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania law
47. Throughout this Article, the phrase "facial challenge" refers to legal challenges in which a court
is asked to declare an abortion law invalid on its face. In contrast, an "as-applied challenge" seeks to
invalidate a statute as applied to a particular set of circumstances. The legal challenge to the
Pennsylvania restrictions was brought as a facial challenge prior to their implementation. As Professor
Michael Dorf has noted, the distinction between these kinds of challenges is significant: "Ifa court holds
a statute unconstitutional on its face, the state may not enforce it under any circumstances, unless an
appropriate court narrows its application; in contrast, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional as
applied to particular facts, the state may enforce the statute in different circumstances." Michael C. Doff,
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994). For a discussion of
the controversy over the legal standard applicable in facial challenges to abortion restrictions, see infra
Part IV.A. 1.
48. See Brief for Respondents at 42-53, 105-17, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902), 1992 WL 551421 at *42-53, *105-17; Defendants Casey,
Richards and Preate's Memorandum of Law at 4-11, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F.
Supp. 1323 (C.A. No. 88-3228); see also Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1373 ("Defendants seem to argue that
the constitutional standard applicable to judicial review of abortion regulations has somehow been
modified by recent Supreme Court decisions."). The Commonwealth argued that in Webster, 492 U.S.
490 (1989), Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health (Akron II), 497 U.S. 502 (1990), the Supreme Court modified the strict scrutiny standard of Roe.
See, e.g., Defendants Casey, Richards and Preate's Memorandum of Law, supra, at 4-6.
49. Id. (rejecting arguments that Webster, Hodgson, and Akron II modified the strict scrutiny
standard of Roe). Applying Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979), the district court
assessed Pennsylvania's informed parental consent requirement to determine whether it unduly
burdened minors' access to abortion. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1382; see infra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text.
50. 492 U.S. 490; see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
51. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694-97 (3d Cir. 1991).
52. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
53. Casey, 947 F.2d at 694-98.
54. Id. at 698 ("[N]o undue burden is caused by abortion regulations that do not have a 'severe' or
'drastic' impact upon time, cost, or the number of legal providers of abortions."); id. at 698 n.14 ("The
definition of [the undue burden] standard-'absolute obstacle or severe limitation'-used by Justice
O'Connor in those cases is binding .... ").
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were constitutional except the husband-notification requirement. 55 Justice
Samuel Alito, then a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, dissented, arguing that the majority had erred in striking down
the husband-notification provision because it did not unduly burden women's
access to abortion56 and was rationally related to the "state's interest in
furthering the husband's interest in the fetus."
57
The court of appeals' maverick opinion led both sides to file petitions for
58certiorari, setting the stage for Supreme Court review. At the time that the
Supreme Court granted review, on January 21, 1992, two new Justices-David
Souter and Clarence Thomas-had joined the court,59 increasing speculation
that the newly-composed Supreme Court would now explicitly overturn Roe v.
Wade.
60
55. Id. at 699-719.
56. Id. at 720-25. In arguing that the husband-notification requirement did not amount to "a severe
limitation" or "absolute obstacle," then-Judge Alito focused primarily on the group of women who were
not affected by the requirement, because they would voluntarily tell their husbands. Id. at 722. With
respect to victims of spousal abuse-the very women who were likely to be affected by the
requirement-then-Judge Alito discounted the record evidence of the serious dangers posed to them by
the husband-notification requirement. See id. at 723 n.6. He also deferred to the legislature's judgment
that the statutory exceptions for these women were adequate, ignoring the trial court's findings that these
exceptions were, in fact, woefully inadequate: "It is apparent that the Pennsylvania legislature
considered this problem and attempted to prevent Section 3209 from causing adverse effects by adopting
the four exceptions noted above. Whether the legislature's approach represents sound public policy is
not a question for us to decide." Id. at 724. For a critique of then-Judge Alito's dissenting opinion in
Casey, see Laurence H. Tribe, Alito 's World. . . and His Miscalculations, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7,
2005, at A 13 ("I do wonder.., about the window through which Alito was gazing at the social world in
which the controversy arose. Was he perhaps viewing the 'burden' on married women in this situation
as simply their due, as something that goes with the territory when a woman weds and thus, almost by
definition, as no 'undue' burden?").
57. Casey, 947 F.2d at 725-27. Then-Judge Alito's opinion reflects a disturbing willingness to defer
to legislative judgments about the impact of abortion restrictions on women regardless of the record
evidence of serious harms that they pose. He reasoned, for example, that the court must defer to the
legislature's judgments about the reasons for and the effects of the husband-notification requirement,
emphasizing that legislation is not irrational "simply because it produces some adverse effects." Id. at
726. He concluded that the Pennsylvania legislature "presumably decided that the law on balance would
be beneficial" and "[w]e have no authority to overrule that legislative judgment even if we deem it
,unwise' or worse." Id.
58. The plaintiffs asked the Court to reaffirm Roe's strict scrutiny standard and to invalidate all of
the challenged provisions under that standard. Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 15-17,
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania asked the Court to
adopt Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard and to uphold all of the challenged provisions under
that standard or, alternatively, to explicitly overrule Roe v. Wade. Brief for Respondents at 42-53; 105-
17, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902). The first Bush administration, supporting the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, asked the Court to overrule Roe by replacing its strict scrutiny
standard with one that asks whether an abortion restriction "is reasonably designed to advance a
legitimate state interest." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15,
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902).
59. Following the Webster decision, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall,
strong supporters of Roe v. Wade, resigned from the Court. President George H. W. Bush appointed
David Souter to the Court in 1990 and Clarence Thomas in 1991. Casey marked the first opportunity for
these new Justices to consider the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion. See TRIBE, supra note 33,
at 243.
60. See. e.g., Henry J. Reske, Is This the End of Roe?: The Court Revisits Abortion, A.B.A. J., May
1992, at 64 ("As the 1980s slipped into the 1990s, the once unthinkable has become the probable. The
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B. The Casey Joint Opinion: Preserving Protection for the Right to Abortion
via a Newly Minted Undue Burden Standard
Confounding pundits and advocates on both sides, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter coauthored 6 1 an opinion, joined in relevant part by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, that reaffirmed what they deemed the three central
tenets of Roe. First, the joint opinion recognized "the right of the woman to
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State." 62 Second, the joint opinion reaffirmed "the State's
power to restrict abortion after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health.' 63 Third, the joint
opinion confirmed "the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus that may become a child.,
64
In reaffirming rather than rejecting Roe's core principles, the joint opinion
relied heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis. The plurality found that the
factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding had not been weakened and that,
in it's nearly two decades of application, Roe had proven workable. 65 The joint
opinion authors expressed deep concern that overruling Roe v. Wade would
substantially undermine the Court's integrity, given the likely public perception
that reversal was due solely to the changing composition of the Court: "[T]o
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious
question." 66 The Casey plurality also emphasized Roe's important role in the
lives of countless American women who had come to rely on its protections;
and recognized the link between reproductive autonomy and women's
autonomy and equality:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
Supreme Court begins its review of this year's abortion cases ... with the realization by many that the
days of the landmark Roe v. Wade . . . are numbered."); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 795-96 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that at the time of
Casey, "[iut was thought that either [Souter or Thomas], and particularly Justice Clarence Thomas, might
cast the fifth vote to overrule Roe v. Wade"); Linda Greenhouse, The Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Apr. 10, 2005, at 28 ("As the country waited for an answer from the court [in Casey] and with a
presidential campaign well under way, advocates on both sides gave Roe little prospect of surviving.").
61. Seesupra note 3.
62. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. As a result, the joint opinion confirmed that prior to viability "the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 860.
66. Id. at 867; see also id. at 869 ("A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary
damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.").
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views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives . . . . The Constitution serves human values, and
while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither
can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.67
Despite its strong language, however, the joint opinion also altered key
aspects of Roe v. Wade, rejecting Roe's strict scrutiny standard as well as its
trimester framework and adopting a more permissive "undue burden"
68standard. In doing so, the joint opinion authors rebalanced the relative
interests of the state and the pregnant woman, emphasizing the state's interest
in protecting matemal health and potential fetal life "from the outset" of the
pregnancy. 69 Roe and its progeny permitted restrictions on pre-viability
abortions only if the government could prove that they served to protect
women's health.70 In contrast, the Casey joint opinion allows states to regulate
all pre-viability abortions to promote the state's interest in potential life or in
protecting the woman's health, as long as the regulations rationally further
71
these state interests and do not unduly burden women's access to abortion.
After Casey, challenges to pre-viability restrictions on abortion can no longer
67. Id. at 856 (citation omitted); see also id. at 851-52 ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life ....
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances.
That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so
unique to the law."); TRIBE, supra note 33, at 255-56 (arguing that, through an "emphasis on equality,
the [Casey] plurality sketched out a new jurisprudential foundation of the right to choose that is in many
ways constitutionally firmer than the approach in Roe, which had somewhat paternalistically focused on
the role of the attending physician in the woman's decision."). In his concurring and dissenting opinion,
Justice Blackmun argued that "restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also implicate
constitutional guarantees of gender equality." Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See generally Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 955, 1013-28 (1984) (arguing that women's equality requires that they can control their
reproduction); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 351-80 (1992) (arguing that abortion
restrictions can violate the antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles underlying the guarantee
of equal protection). For suggestions on alternatives to the legal analysis of the Court in Roe v. Wade,
see WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-79; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 869; see also id. at 872 ("Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments
of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that
there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree
of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself."). Our analysis here of the Casey joint
opinion was first presented in our Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Record or,
Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 822 F.
Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Civ. No. 88-3228).
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872. Nevertheless, the joint opinion declined to designate the state's interest
in protecting potential life as "compelling." See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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focus exclusively on the absence of a health justification. Rather, challengers
must prove that the restrictions pose undue burdens. 72 The Casey joint opinion
thus charted a new path for abortion regulation that undoubtedly represents less
constitutional protection than that afforded by Roe. Yet, as discussed below, a
close analysis of the Casey standard demonstrates that the authors of the joint
opinion intended to replace the Roe framework with a rigorous standard that
carefully examines both the actual impact of restrictions on the women they
affect and the governmental purpose underlying them.
The plurality carefully articulated a new standard, which, on its face,
provided stronger protection for the abortion right than Justice O'Connor's
earlier iterations. In doing so, the joint opinion explicitly disavowed prior
discussions of the undue burden standard,73 and noted its agreement with the
ultimate objective of Roe's trimester framework-i.e., "ensur[ing] that the
woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in
promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact.",74 In
"refin[ing] the undue burden analysis," 75 the plurality rejected its narrow
formulation in Justice O'Connor's prior opinions, which had defined undue
burden as an "absolute obstacle[] or severe limitation[] on the abortion
,,76decision. In its place, the joint opinion clarified that an undue burden exists
where a regulation places "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." '77 Thus, under the newly-minted
72. Casey thus also increased the quantum of proof required to successfully challenge restrictions
on abortion. Under Roe, once plaintiffs proved that a statute created more than a de minimis impact
upon a woman's right to choose abortion, the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate that the
provisions were narrowly drawn to serve a compelling purpose. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Casey, 505
U.S. at 929 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In contrast, Casey requires
challengers of abortion regulations to show in the first instance that the statute "unduly burdens" the
abortion right. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-79.
73. Id. at 876 ("The concept of undue burden has been utilized by the Court as well as individual
Members of the Court, including two of us, in ways that could be considered inconsistent .... Because
we set forth a standard of general application to which we intend to adhere, it is important to clarify
what is meant by an undue burden.") (citations omitted); id. at 877 ("To the extent that the opinions of
the Court or of individual Justices use the undue burden standard in a manner that is inconsistent with
this analysis, we set out what in our view should be the controlling standard.").
74. Id. at 872. While reaffirming this objective, the joint opinion emphasized that it did not agree
"that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish [it]." Id.
75. Id. at 879.
76. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); see supra note 30.
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). The papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, now
contained in the Library of Congress, contain five drafts of the joint opinion. See Drafts of Joint Opinion
(available in The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Madison Building, Manuscript
Division [hereinafter The Blackmun Papers]; on file with the authors). An analysis of these drafts shows
that the definition of the undue burden standard did evolve slightly. The first two drafts of the joint
opinion, for example, defined undue burden as "a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing serious obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-
viable fetus." 1st draft of joint op. at 32-33 (June 3, 1993), in The Blackmun Papers, supra; 2d draft of
joint op. at 34 (June 22, 1992), in The Blackmun Papers, supra. In the third draft, the word "serious"
was changed to "substantial." 3d draft of joint op. at 35-37 (June 25, 1992), in The Blackmun Papers,
supra. References to improper legislative purpose appeared in the first draft, although subsequent drafts
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formulation, regulations pose an undue burden even where they do not amount
to "absolute obstacles" or "severe limitations." 78 Moreover, the joint opinion
further buttressed the undue burden test by adding a second prong relating to
governmental purpose. The test now encompasses not just regulations that
unduly impinge upon women seeking abortion (i.e., an effects prong), but also
those that are created by government with that purpose in mind:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen
by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.
79
Finally, in defining undue burden, the Court clarified that even laws designed
to further permissible state interests are unconstitutional if they place an undue
burden on women seeking abortions. In contrast, in prior dissenting opinions,
Justice O'Connor had suggested that the undue burden analysis was merely a
"threshold inquiry" and that regulations found to be unduly burdensome could
be justified by compelling state interests. 81 The Casey joint opinion explicitly
rejects this formulation, emphasizing, "[iun our considered judgment, an undue
burden is an unconstitutional burden."
82
C. The Joint Opinion's Application of the Undue Burden Standard
While the joint opinion's abstract invocation of its refined undue burden
analysis clearly suggests that its authors intended a relatively protective
standard, deducing the meaning of the undue burden standard from the joint
added the word "purpose" to individual sentences where it had presumably inadvertently been omitted.
Compare 1st draft of joint op. at 34-35 (June 3, 1993), in The Blackmun Papers, supra ("Unnecessary
health regulations that have the effect of presenting a serious obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
may amount to an undue burden on the right."), with 3d draft ofjoint op. at 37 (June 25, 1992), in The
Blackmun Papers, supra ("Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting
a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.") (emphasis
added).
78. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). The joint opinion also makes clear that regulations
"designed to persuade [women] to choose childbirth over abortion" must be "reasonably related to that
goal." Id. at 878.
80. Id. at 877 ("Understood another way, we answer the question, left open in previous opinions
discussing the undue burden formulation, whether a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal
life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability could be
constitutional .... The answer is no.") (citation omitted); see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
The mere fact, for example, that a legislature concluded that the burdens posed by the spousal-
notification provisions were justified, as then-Judge Alito argued in voting to uphold the Pennsylvania
spousal-notification provision, see supra note 56, is not determinative.
81. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The 'undue burden' required in the
abortion cases represents the threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can require a
State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard.").
82. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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opinion's application of it to the Pennsylvania law is more difficult. On the one
hand, the undue burden standard was strong enough to invalidate the husband-
notification provision and its related reporting requirement. On the other hand,
several provisions of the Pennsylvania law, including the mandatory waiting
period, survived the joint authors' application of the undue burden standard.
Yet, even while upholding some of the Pennsylvania restrictions, the joint
authors signaled that the new standard was meant to provide reasonable
protection and that those very provisions might not survive under a different
factual record.
The joint opinion's analysis of the husband-notification and reporting
provisions, sections 3209 and 3214(a)(12) of the Pennsylvania Act
respectively, contains much that protects a woman's right to choose abortion.
The joint opinion explicitly rejected the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's
argument that the husband-notification requirement imposed no undue burden
because the vast majority of married women voluntarily tell their husbands of
the abortion decision and thus "only one percent of the women who obtain
abortions" are actually affected by the requirement. 83 The joint opinion
emphasized:
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom
the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for
consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose
conduct it affects .... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the
law is irrelevant.
84
In focusing on those women who are the "real target" of the husband-
notification requirement,85  the joint opinion authors rejected the
Commonwealth's rights-by-numbers approach that would deny constitutional
protection to the very women affected by the law because this group consisted
of only a small number of women. 86 Moreover, in invalidating the husband-
notification provision on its face even though the plaintiff-providers had not
shown that it would be invalid in all circumstances, the Justices implicitly
rejected the Solicitor General's claim that, under United States v. Salerno,
87
83. Id. at 894.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 895.
86. Indeed, the Commonwealth alleged that the effects of the spousal-notification requirement
would be "felt by only one percent of the women who obtain abortions.... [Moreover] some of these
women will be able to notify their husbands without adverse consequences or will qualify for one of the
exceptions." Id. at 894.
87. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In holding that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not facially invalid,
the Court stated in Salerno that "[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." Id.
Casey was not the first occasion on which the Supreme Court decided facial challenges to
abortion restrictions without applying the "no set of circumstances" standard. See, e.g., Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1990) (invalidating on its face two-parent notification statute, in part,
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facial challengers must prove that there is "no set of circumstances ... under
which [the challenged regulation] would be valid., 8 8 Instead, the joint opinion
found that the providers had met their burden of proof under the new standard
because "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the legislation] is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion."
89
In applying the undue burden standard to the husband-notification
provision, the joint opinion authors were strikingly sensitive to the specific
social context in which forced husband-notification would operate, connecting
and understanding the interrelationship between domestic violence and
women's reproductive autonomy. The Justices gave great deference to the
detailed factual findings of the district court that documented the severity and
pervasiveness of domestic violence, the inadequacy of the statutory exceptions
to the notification requirement, and the grave dangers posed by forcing victims
of domestic battering and marital rape to notify their husbands of their abortion.
These findings, together with numerous other independent social science
studies, 90 led the joint opinion authors, with Justices Blackmun and Stevens, to
conclude that the spousal notification requirement amounted to an undue
burden.
91
A requirement that all women be affected by an abortion restriction would
have considerably diluted the degree of constitutional protection:
It would be difficult to justify a constitutional test that permitted states
to enact restrictions that wholly precluded choice for some women
merely because those restrictions would not constitute an "undue
burden" for other, more fortunate women. Such an approach would
simply draw a social and economic line across society, above which
because in "dysfunctional families" the statute proved "positively harmful to the minor and her family");
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 434-39 (1983) (invalidating a
law requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital even though the requirement
might be valid as applied to abortions later in the pregnancy). See generally Dorf, supra note 47, at 272
(noting that the Supreme Court has often decided facial challenges in the abortion context without
applying the Salerno standard).
88. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 19, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902), 1992 WL 12006421. The Casey
joint opinion did not explicitly address Salerno and did not elaborate on the reasons for its
inapplicability in the abortion context. However, in declaring the husband-notice provision facially
invalid, the joint opinion emphasized that "the significant number of women who fear for their safety...
are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed
abortion in all cases." Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. Pre-enforcement facial invalidation, thus, was essential
because Pennsylvania's mandatory spousal-notification effectively forced these women to choose
between putting their lives in jeopardy and foregoing their constitutional right to abortion entirely. See
infra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
89. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (emphasis added).
90. In addition to crediting eighteen fact findings by the trial court, the joint opinion took judicial
notice of studies by the American Medical Association, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and many
individual social scientists. Id. at 891-92.
91. Id. at 897 ("The women most affected by this law-those who most reasonably fear the
consequences of notifying their husbands that they are pregnant-are in the gravest danger.").
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women would be able to have safe and legal abortions, and below
which women would be returned to illegal and dangerous
alternatives.
92
The joint opinion's insistence on both an empirical, quantitative inquiry and
one that focuses on the particular women affected by an abortion law
strengthened the undue burden standard significantly. Moreover, the focus on a
fact-bound measure of the burdens imposed on women avoids non-empirical
subjective judgments by judges about whether a burden is too heavy. Rather,
the inquiry properly focuses on whether the empirical record shows that the
restrictions are likely to pose substantial obstacles for certain women.
The joint opinion's analysis of the spousal notification provision is also
noteworthy because it explicitly recognized and condemned the outmoded
conception of married women's autonomy that underlay this requirement. The
joint opinion deemed the notification requirement an impermissible "dominion"
of husbands over wives reminiscent of long-abandoned views of married
women's subordinate status:
Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the
common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present
understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by
the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected
liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals,
male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental
power; even where that power is emp3loyed for the supposed benefit of
a member of the individual's family.
In contrast, the joint opinion's well-reasoned, highly contextualized
analysis of the spousal notification provision is difficult to reconcile with its
application of the undue burden standard to uphold other provisions of the
Pennsylvania law. Indeed, the joint opinion has been widely criticized by
commentators who have correctly noted the perplexing inconsistency between
its treatment of the spousal notification provision and most of the other
challenged provisions.
94
In upholding Pennsylvania's mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period,
the joint opinion authors took note of extensive findings by the district court
that documented the serious burdens posed by this requirement:
[B]ecause of the distances many women must travel to reach an
abortion provider, the practical effect will often be a delay of much
more than a day because the waiting period requires that a woman
seeking an abortion must make at least two visits to the doctor ....
[T]he District Court found that for those women who have the fewest
92. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 35, at 103.
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
94. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 29, at 2036-38; Martha A. Field, Abortion Law Today, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 3, 13-16 (1993); [Supreme Court] Note, Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 162, 206
(1993).
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financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those
who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands,
employers or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be "particularly
burdensome."
95
While noting that "[t]hese findings are troubling in some respects" and that the
constitutionality of the waiting period posed a "closer question" than that of
other challenged provisions, the joint opinion refused, with no satisfactory
explanation, to find a constitutional violation.96 The joint authors reasoned that
We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting period has
the effect of 'increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions,' but the
district court did not conclude that the increased costs and potential
delays amount to substantial obstacles .... We also disagree with the
District Court's conclusion that the 'particularly burdensome' effects
of the waiting period on some women require its invalidation. A
particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle.
97
Thus, as Professor Laurence Tribe has argued, "[i]n large part, the plurality
based its decision-somewhat hypertechnically--on the district court's own
characterization of the waiting period as 'particularly burdensome' rather than a
'substantial obstacle." '98 The plurality's reasoning on this point is especially
illogical and troubling given that at the time the district court made its factual
findings the Roe v. Wade strict scrutiny standard remained in place, and the
undue burden standard as then formulated by Justice O'Connor used
significantly different terminology and required different proof. To expect the
district court to have intuited the new standard-and to have foretold its
specific requirement that restrictions have the "purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle" on the right to choose abortion-was unreasonable and
created uncertainty about the meaning of the new standard. Moreover, while
the joint opinion authors easily recognized that forcing married women to
notify their husbands was grounded in archaic sex-role stereotypes, in
upholding the state-mandated counseling scripts as a "reasonable measure
designed to ensure an informed choice," 99 they turned a blind eye to the reality
that both this requirement and the mandatory waiting period likewise "rest[ed]
on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity
of women."
100
95. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 886-87 (emphasis added). The plurality invoked its expansive reading of the Act's
medical emergency definition, see infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text, in refusing to conclude
that "the waiting period imposes a real health risk." Id. at 886.
98. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 249; see also Field, supra note 94, at 16 (noting that the district court
"had not found a 'substantial burden' largely because that was not yet required and therefore the court
was not looking for one").
99. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
100. Id. at 918 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see David H. Gans,
Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law,
104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1895 (1995) (criticizing the joint opinion for failing to "perceive the interest in
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Also troubling was the plurality's unwillingness either to examine the
district court's factual findings of the burdens posed by the informed parental
consent provision or to consider the extensive social science data documenting
the harmful effects of parental consent requirements. 01  In contrast to its
willingness to ground its analysis of the husband-notification requirement in the
context of the realities of women's lives, the joint opinion summarily rejected
the providers' arguments against parental consent as a "reprise of their
arguments" on other provisions, engaging in no analysis whatsoever of the
factual record that documented the experiences of young women and the
unique difficulties they face in accessing abortion.'
0 2
Although these shortcomings in the joint opinion's analysis raise serious
concerns, the plurality's application of the undue burden standard to uphold
some of the challenged provisions also had positive aspects. The validation of
Pennsylvania's narrow definition of "medical emergency," for example, was
conditioned on an insistence that it be construed broadly to encompass three
life-threatening medical conditions that the district court found were not
covered by the statute. 10 3 In doing so, the plurality emphasized that if the
narrow definition of medical emergency foreclosed the possibility of an
immediate abortion in the face of "significant" health risks, "we would be
required to invalidate the restrictive operation of the provision, for the essential
holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her
health."' 1 4 In its analysis of this provision, the joint opinion authors thus
underscored their continuing commitment that the lives and health of women
remain paramount over the State's interest in restricting abortion.
Additionally, in upholding the challenged recordkeeping and reporting
requirements of the Pennsylvania statute, the joint opinion first carefully
scrutinized these requirements to determine if they were "'reasonably directed
to the preservation of maternal health and ... properly respect a patient's
confidentiality and privacy."" 0 5 The plurality also made clear that even though
these provisions were, in its view, reasonably related to the State's interest in
preserving women's health, they would nonetheless be invalid if they had the
discouraging abortion as an interest in forcing women to bear children" and not "recogniz[ing] in such
regulations stereotypical assumptions about women's obligations as mothers").
101. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-90 (joint opinion). The joint opinion ignored the district court's ample
findings that the Pennsylvania provision created obstacles far harsher than any prior parental consent
statute because it forced both the parent and the young woman to come to the abortion provider for
mandatory counseling. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1382-84 (E.D.
Pa. 1990). For an in-depth critique of the Casey joint opinion's analysis of the informed parent consent
requirement, see [Supreme Court] Note, supra note 94, at 206-10.
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-90.
103. Id. at 879-80 (agreeing with the court of appeals that the statutory definition of medical
emergency includes pre-eclampsia, inevitable abortion, and prematurely ruptured membranes).
104. Id. at 880.
105. Id. at 900 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976)).
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purpose or effect of placing substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking
abortions.10 6 In finding that the recordkeeping and reporting provisions did not
impose a substantial obstacle, the joint authors interpreted the record as
establishing only that these provisions might increase the cost of abortions by
"a slight amount," but conceded that "at some point increased cost could
become a substantial obstacle." 10 7 This concession again demonstrates that the
joint authors intended the newly formulated undue burden standard to provide
substantially broader protection for the abortion right than that envisioned by
Justice O'Connor in her prior formulations of undue burden. As Professors
Estrich and Sullivan highlighted in their excellent pre-Casey critique of Justice
O'Connor's undue burden concept, she "ha[d] never acknowledged that
significant cost increases constitute 'burdens' on abortion. ' 0 And, perhaps
even more troubling, even if those cost increases posed burdens, her dissenting
opinions in Akron I and other cases demonstrated a willingness to uphold health
regulations regardless of the substantial burdens posed by them.10 9 The Casey
joint opinion responds to these concerns, strengthening the undue burden
analysis by protecting women against health regulations that either are not
designed to protect women's health or cause price increases and other burdens
that become substantial obstacles for women seeking abortions.
Finally, the authors of the joint opinion carefully limited their conclusions
about the provisions that they upheld to the facts before them in the existing
record. In upholding the mandatory waiting period, the plurality emphasized
that it was doing so based "on the record before [the Court], and in the context
of this facial challenge." 110  Likewise, the plurality carefully limited its
validation of the state-scripted counseling provision, stressing that "there is no
106. See id. at 900-01; id. at 878 ("Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the
right.").
107. Id. at 901. The district court found that the mandatory disclosure of certain information would
negatively affect the providers because "referring physicians and, to a lesser extent, performing
physicians will terminate their relationship with the clinics." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
744 F. Supp. 1323, 1371 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The district court rejected the argument that the reporting
requirements posed a significant financial burden on the clinics based on the evidentiary record before
it:
The evidence of record suggests that plaintiff-clinics have, in fact, incurred additional
administrative costs as a result of the reporting requirements. However, there was no
testimony which suggests that any of the plaintiff-clinics have raised the fees for an abortion
because of these added expenses. Further, I find that the additional cost to plaintiff-clinics is
not so great that, in and of itself, it imposes a legally significant burden on the right to obtain
an abortion.
Id. at 1391.
108. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 138-39.
109. Id. at 140; see, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Cent. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416,
467 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("A health regulation simply does not rise to the level of 'official
interference' with the abortion decision."); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476, 504 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that medical regulation
that poses an undue burden can be upheld if it "'reasonably relate[s] to the preservation and protection
of maternal health') (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
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evidence on this record that [the provision] would amount in practical terms to
a substantial obstacle.""1 1 And, as noted above, the Justices acknowledged that
the increased costs of recordkeeping and reporting provisions could become a
substantial obstacle, upholding them only because "there is no such showing on
the record before us." 12 Accordingly, as other individual members of the Court
agreed,' 13 the joint opinion did not finally resolve the fate of either the
Pennsylvania restrictions or similar laws in other states. Rather, its findings of
constitutionality were preliminary and based on a specific factual record.
Indeed, in post-Supreme Court proceedings, the district court, recognizing this
limitation of the joint opinion, granted the providers' request to continue their
facial challenge by putting on factual proof to meet the new undue burden
standard. 114 While the district court's decision was ultimately reversed on
appeal, the Casey joint opinion nonetheless explicitly left the door open to
subsequent as-applied challenges to the Pennsylvania provisions and facial
challenges to similar laws in other states. The Third Circuit noted, for example,
that by limiting its findings to the record before it, the Casey plurality
"signalled that it was not announcing a per se rule."' 1 5 Rather, "the Court
meant that other state abortion laws require individualized application of the
undue burden standard" and "a future 'as applied' challenge to the
Pennsylvania Act would be possible." 116 In denying the providers' motion to
stay the court of appeals' mandate, Justice Souter agreed that "litigants are free
to challenge similar restrictions in other jurisdictions, as well as these very
provisions as applied."' 17
11. Id. at 884.
112. Id. at 901.
113. See infra notes 124, 129 and accompanying text.
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227, 235-36 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
district court found:
Consideration of fairness and the possibility of undue prejudice compels a decision to reopen
the record in this case. Plaintiffs litigated this case in accordance with the law of the land at
the time of the trial, which was the strict scrutiny framework of Roe v. Wade.
... [T]he Supreme Court carefully limited its conclusions to the record before it,
acknowledging that on a different record different conclusions could be reached. Plaintiffs
claim that they will present evidence that shows that the amended Act has the purpose and
effect of putting a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus, proof that was not necessary under prior law. To deny them this opportunity
would be fundamentally unfair, as plaintiffs have essentially had the rules of the game
changed while in the midst of play.
Id. at 235-36 (citations omitted).
115. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 861 (3d Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 861-62. The court of appeals conceded that "[tihe fact-bound nature of the new
standard ... suggests that a challenge after enforcement of the Pennsylvania Act might yield a different
result on its constitutionality." Id. at 863. The court of appeals also agreed that the Supreme Court
rejected the facial challenge standard of United States v. Salerno. Id. at 863 n.2 1; see supra notes 87-88
and accompanying text.
117. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (1994) (citing Fargo Women's
Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay)). Justice
Souter noted, however, that "there is no occasion to consider here the Court of Appeals' broader
assertion that, even in cases where a statute's facial validity depends on an empirical record.., a
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D. The Casey Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The separate opinions of individual members also provide insight into the
meaning of Casey's undue burden standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices White and Thomas, wrote separate concurring and
dissenting opinions in which they explicitly called for the overruling of Roe v.
Wade' 18-a goal we now know they had come perilously close to achieving.' 1 9
However, while sharply criticizing the undue burden standard as both
"rootless"'120 and "inherently standardless,"' 121 Justice Scalia acknowledged that
the joint opinion expressly "repudiate[ed] the more narrow formulations" used
in past opinions and that the "strong adjectives [of past opinions] are
conspicuously missing from the joint opinion, whose authors have ... now
determined that a burden is 'undue' if it merely poses a 'substantial' obstacle to
abortion decisions."' 122 Justice Scalia criticized the joint opinion authors for
"stealthily downgrad[ing]" the State's interest in "unborn human life ... [from
a 'compelling interest'] to a merely 'substantial' or 'profound' interest."'123 He
also recognized that "the 'undue burden' standard may ultimately require the
decision rejecting one such challenge must be dispositive as against all other possible litigants." Id. at
1311 n.3.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can
and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional
cases."); id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The issue is whether [the right
to choose abortion] is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.").
119. Significantly, the papers of Justice Blackmun reveal that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas, along with Justice Kennedy, voted in conference to uphold all of the
challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania law. The Blackmun papers contain a first draft of this five-
member majority opinion, dated May 27, 1992, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The draft opinion
concludes that "the Court was mistaken in Roe when it classified a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy as a 'fundamental right' that could be abridged only in a manner which withstood 'strict
scrutiny."' First Draft of Chief Justice Rehnquist at II (May 27, 1992) (available in The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 77; on file with the authors). Effectively overruling Roe v. Wade, the opinion would
have substituted a minimum rationality standard for the Roe strict scrutiny standard: "[a] woman's
interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may
regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 12. At oral
argument before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, arguing on behalf of the United
States, would only acknowledge one specific instance in which an abortion ban could not survive such
rational basis review: "a complete prohibition that had no exception for the life of [the] mother."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
120. Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 992 (arguing that the "standardless nature" of the undue burden standard "invites the
district judge to give effect to his personal preferences about abortion").
122. Id. at 988-89. But see id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The joint opinion, following its newly minted variation on stare decisis, retains the outer shell of Roe
v. Wade... but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that case.") (citation omitted); id. at 954
("Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie exists: a mere faqade to
give the illusion of reality.").
123. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia sarcastically
noted that "[t]hat had to be done, of course, since designating the interest as 'compelling' throughout
pregnancy would have been, shall we say, a 'substantial obstacle' to the joint opinion's determined
effort to reaffirm what it views as the 'central holding' of Roe." Id.
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invalidation of each provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a better
record, that the State is too effectively 'express[ing] a preference for childbirth
over abortion."' 
1 24
Justices Stevens and Blackmun each wrote separately to voice their
disagreement with the joint opinion's dismantling of the trimester framework
and abandonment of strict scrutiny. 2 Yet, in doing so, both Justices expressed
confidence that the new standard would ultimately ensure meaningful
protection for a woman's right to choose abortion. In arguing that the
challenged provisions were unconstitutional under either Roe's strict scrutiny
standard or the new undue burden test, Justice Stevens noted his belief that the
undue burden standard represented more than just rhetorical preservation of
abortion rights:
The future may also demonstrate that a standard that analyzes both the
severity of a regulatory burden and the legitimacy of its justifications
will provide a fully adequate framework for the review of abortion
legislation even if the contours of the standard are not authoritatively
articulated in any single opinion.
126
Roe's author, Justice Blackmun, made an impassioned case for retaining the
Roe trimester framework, yet openly expressed his relief that Roe's central
holding had been reaffirmed: "But now, just when so many expected the
darkness to fall, the flame has grown bright . . . . Make no mistake, the joint
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal
courage and constitutional principle." 127 Justice Blackmun praised the authors
of the joint opinion for striking down the husband-notification provision, and
noted that, in doing so, "the Court has established a framework for evaluating
abortion regulations that responds to the social context of women facing issues
of reproductive choice . . . . [a]nd in applying its test, the Court remains
sensitive to the unique role of women in the decisionmaking process." 128 While
disagreeing with Justice Scalia on everything else, Justice Blackmun agreed
that the new standard had been used to uphold the Pennsylvania provisions only
based on the record before the Court, and that it might ultimately be applied to
invalidate those very provisions:
[W]hile I believe that the joint opinion errs in failing to invalidate the
other regulations, I am pleased that the joint opinion has not ruled out
the possibility that these regulations may be shown to impose an
unconstitutional burden. The joint opinion makes clear that its specific
holdings are based on the insufficiency of the record before it .... I
am confident that in the future evidence will be produced to show that
124. Id. at 992-93.
125. Id. at 914-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 926-40 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 920 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 922-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Id. at 924-25.
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"in a large fraction of the cases in which [these regulations are]
relevant, [they] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion."'
129
Justice Blackmun's personal papers from the Casey litigation, now housed
at the Library of Congress, also reveal his optimism that the new undue burden
standard would adequately protect Roe's core principles. Upon learning from
Justice Kennedy that he had decided to join forces with Justices O'Connor and
Souter in the joint opinion,1 30 Justice Blackmun wrote: "Roe sound, th[ough]
not trimester sys[tem].' 131 As Linda Greenhouse recently argued, "The choice
of this slightly old-fashioned word was significant. To a lawyer, 'sound'
conveys not just survival but correctness and legitimacy." 132 Following his
retirement from the Court, Justice Blackmun expressed admiration for the joint
opinion authors' "robust view of individual liberty and the equal protection
undertone of their opinion and their respect for stare decisis" and remained
steadfast in his optimism that Roe would remain sound: "I am optimistic that
the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in the Casey case
will generally stand, and that those three Justices will continue to reaffirm
Roe's holding."1
33
III. POST-CASEY SUPREME COURT UNDUE BURDEN JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has elaborated the undue burden standard's precise
contours in only three cases that produced full opinions from the Court:
134
129. Id. at 926.
130. On May 29, 1992, Justice Kennedy, who had initially voted to uphold the Pennsylvania law
under rational basis review, see supra note 119, sent Justice Blackmun a handwritten note in which he
asked to see Blackmun: "I want to tell you about some developments in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
and at least part of what I say should come as welcome news." Note from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (May 29, 1992) (available in The Blackmun Papers, supra note 77; on file
with the authors). The next day when the two met, Kennedy revealed that he was joining forces with
Justices O'Connor and Souter to reaffirm the central holding of Roe v. Wade. See LINDA GREENHOUSE,
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 203-04 (2005).
131. Handwritten notes by Justice Harry A. Blackmun (undated) (available in The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 77; on file with the authors).
132. GREENHOUSE, supra note 130, at 204.
133. The Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project, Interview by Harold Hongju Koh, Professor,
Yale Law School, with Justice Harry Blackmun in New Haven, Conn., at 504 (June 20, 1995) (available
in The Blackmun Papers, supra note 77; on file with the authors). Indeed, Justice Blackmun held out
hope that the Court would ultimately readopt the strict scrutiny standard. Id.
134. Although the Court has only applied the undue burden standard on three occasions, Casey's
precedent has solidified and expanded constitutional protection for personal autonomy in other contexts.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and striking down Texas's criminal sodomy statute, Justice Kennedy relied heavily upon
Casey's concepts of liberty, dignity, and autonomy. As one commentator has noted: "By reaffirming and
validating this expansive notion of personal autonomy, Lawrence helps to rehabilitate its long-criticized
lineage of reproductive rights cases, placing them on firmer legal footing than ever before." Cynthia
Dailard, What Lawrence v. Texas Says About the History and Future of Reproductive Rights, in 6
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 4, 6 (Oct. 2003); see also Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas: A
Case for Cautious Optimism Regarding Procreative Liberty, 25 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 249 (2004)
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Mazurek v. Armstrong,135 Stenberg v. Carhart,136 and Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England.137 While these opinions taken together
stopped short of providing the clear guidance some lower courts sought,1 38 the
Court reaffirmed and in some ways strengthened the protection announced in
Casey, albeit by a slim margin.
139
A. Mazurek v. Armstrong
Mazurek v. Armstrong,140 handed down in 1997, represents the Court's
most thorough treatment of the purpose prong of the undue burden test since
Casey. A group of Montana physicians and a physician-assistant, Susan Cahill,
challenged a Montana statute restricting the performance of abortions to
licensed physicians. Cahill was the only physician-assistant in the state who
performed abortions. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute prohibiting Cahill
from continuing to provide abortion services constituted an undue burden on
abortion rights and amounted to a bill of attainder directed against her. The
district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction,
determining that the plaintiffs had not proven that they had a "fair chance of
success" on the merits of either their undue burden or bill of attainder claim,
despite clear evidence that the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute had
been to eliminate Susan Cahill as a source of abortion care in Montana.
14 1
Rejecting this evidence, the district court embraced an almost impossibly high
threshold for making out a purpose prong claim, concluding that plaintiffs
would have had to prove that "none of the individual legislators approving the
(arguing that Lawrence revitalized substantive due process in gaining majority support on the Court for
an expansive notion of individual liberty); Jane S. Schachter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 733 (2004) (contending that
Lawrence "delivered a doctrinal punch by virtue of its surprisingly expansive language about liberty-
based rights" (emphasis removed)); Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, Warts and All: Four Score of Liberty,
Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004) (identifying the right recognized in Lawrence as an
individual right to sexual self-determination). But see Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of
Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence recognizes a narrower
view of liberty than the reproductive rights cases preceding it).
135. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
136. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
137. 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
138. See discussion infra Part IV.
139. While the Court also addressed an abortion restriction in Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292,
297 (1997), this decision was a narrow one, in which the Court upheld a Montana parental notification
law on the ground that the statute was "indistinguishable" from the one upheld in Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health (Akron I1), 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
140. Mazurek, 520 U.S. 968.
141. Id. at 970 (citing Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 567-68 (1996)). Plaintiffs had presented
evidence that the proponents of the physician-only restriction had engaged in a concerted campaign to
drive Cahill out of practice in order to restrict the availability of abortion care, and had enacted the
physician-only law as a part of that campaign. See id. at 979-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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passage of [the restriction] was motivated by a desire to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion."'
' 42
On appeal from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and attempted to provide some guidance
on purpose prong proof by looking both at Casey and at legislative purpose in
other constitutional settings. The Casey test, the court of appeals noted, inquires
whether an abortion restriction "'serve[s] no purpose other than to make
abortions more difficult."",143 Commenting that "the Supreme Court has not
elaborated on the means of determining legislative purpose under the Casey
standard,"'144 the appeals court turned to Miller v. Johnson145 and Shaw v.
Hunt,146 a pair of legislative redistricting cases, to flesh out the standard:
"Legislative purpose to accomplish a constitutionally forbidden result may be
found when that purpose was 'the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision." ' 147 Furthermore, the proof of such an impermissible
purpose "may be gleaned both from the structure of the legislation and from
examination of the process that led to its enactment." 48 The appeals court
refrained from ruling on the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, but
held that the plaintiffs had met their burden of demonstrating a "'fair chance of
success'" on their purpose prong claim, and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of the balance of the equities. 149 Proceedings on
remand never occurred. In the same per curiam order in which it granted
certiorari, the Supreme Court issued a summary ruling reaching the merits of
the plaintiffs' claims, despite the preliminary procedural posture of the case and
the narrowness of the ruling below.
Far from solidifying the undue burden standard, Mazurek injected it with
an element of uncertainty. Starting with the observation that the plaintiffs had
produced insufficient evidence to establish that the physician-only law would
have the unconstitutional effect of posing a substantial obstacle to abortion, the
Court flirted with the suggestion that an unconstitutional purpose standing
alone would not suffice to invalidate an abortion restriction:
But even assuming the correctness of the Court of Appeals' implicit
premise-that a legislative purpose to interfere with the
142. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (D. Mont. 1995).
143. Armstrong, 94 F.3d 566, 567 (1996) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 901 (1992)).
144. Id. at 567.
145. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
146. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
147. Armstrong, 94 F.3d at 567 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 916); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 920
(holding that Georgia's redistricting legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause after determining
that race was the "predominant, overriding factor" motivating the legislature).
148. Armstrong, 94 F.3d at 567 (citing Shaw, 517 U.S. at 899-906); see also Shaw, 517 U.S. at 905
(permitting plaintiffs to prove impermissible motive through circumstantial evidence of the district's
shape or demographics, or through direct evidence of legislative purpose).
149. Armstrong, 94 F.3d at 567-68 (citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir.
1994)).
[Vol. 18:2
Preserving the Core of Roe
constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of
interfering with that right (here it is uncontested that there was
insufficient evidence of a "substantial obstacle" to abortion) could
render the Montana law invalid-there is no basis for finding a
vitiating legislative purpose here.
1 50
With the waters thus muddied, 151 the Court refused to discuss whether the
court of appeals had identified the correct method for determining improper
legislative purpose in this context-Miller's and Shaw's close scrutiny of the
totality of the circumstances, the inquiry into whether the improper purpose
was the "predominant factor" motivating the legislature, and the inferences
drawn from the statute's structure and legislative history. 152 Significantly, the
Court did not repudiate that mode of analysis for abortion cases. Rather, the
Court focused upon the absence of evidence establishing an adverse impact on
women's access to abortion 53 and the absence of direct evidence of evil motive
on the part of Montana legislators.
154
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented, arguing
that, "[w]hen one looks at the totality of circumstances surrounding the
legislation, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the
legislature's predominant motive.., was to make abortions more difficult."'
155
As Justice Stevens noted recently, the determination of an improper legislative
purpose is a "manageable judicial task.'"156 In not looking more searchingly into
the motives of the Montana legislature, the Mazurek Court imparted an element
of confusion to an inquiry that it has undertaken in numerous other
150. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
151. Caitlin Borgmann, for example, notes that "Mazurek calls into question whether an improper
purpose alone could ever suffice to invalidate an abortion restriction." Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter
Count: Taking Stock ofAbortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 675, 691 n. 10
(2004).
152. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 974 n.2. The Court reasoned that it was unnecessary to address the court
of appeals' reading of Miller and Shaw because the record did not support a determination that the
legislature's predominant motive was to create a substantial obstacle to abortion. Id.
153. See id. at 974.
154. The Court reasoned that the fact that the purported health justification for the Montana law
was contradicted by available studies did not support a finding of improper purpose because "states have
broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed physicians, even if
an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others." Id. at 973
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992)). The Court also summarily
rejected evidence that an anti-abortion group had drafted the Montana law because it "[said] nothing
significant about the legislature's purpose in passing it." Id. The Court also found that the fact that the
law affected only a single practitioner contradicted a finding of improper legislative motive, especially
since "no woman seeking an abortion would be required by the new law to travel to a different facility
than was previously available." Id. at 974.
155. Id. at 980 (internal citation omitted). Justice Stevens further complained that the case did not
have "sufficient importance to justify review of the merits at this preliminary stage of the proceeding,"
id. at 977, but that, since review had been granted, the Court "should provide some enlightenment as to
whether the Court of Appeals misread this Court's opinions in Miller and Shaw v. Hunt," id. at 981.
156. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 2632 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) and
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276-80 (1979)).
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constitutional contexts. 157 Still, Mazurek cannot fairly be read to foreclose a
finding of undue burden based on improper purpose alone, nor does it derogate
from the Miller and Shaw methodology for determining legislative purpose. As
discussed in Part IV below, however, lower courts have misread Mazurek in
precisely this manner, misconstruing it as the death of the purpose prong.158
B. Stenberg v. Carhart
In eight separate opinions producing a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court in
2000 struck down Nebraska's criminal ban on certain abortion procedures.'
59
Stenberg v. Carhart was the first challenge to abortion restrictions to be fully
briefed and argued to the Supreme Court since Casey. Eight years after Casey,
the margin of majority support for abortion rights had thinned, but far from
eroding Casey, Stenberg strengthened it.
Justice Breyer's majority opinion invalidating the Nebraska abortion
procedure ban 16  began with the announcement that the Court would not
"revisit those legal principles" determined by Roe and redetermined by
Casey. 16 Applying those principles, the Court held that Nebraska's abortion
procedure ban violated the Constitution for "at least two independent
reasons."' 162 First, the statute lacked any exception for procedures needed to
preserve the patient's health. The Court relied on Casey and revived a host of
pre-Casey holdings to support its conclusion that "the governing standard
requires an exception where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother, for this Court has made
clear that a State may promote but not endanger a woman's health when it
157. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (finding an impermissible legislative
purpose underlying Louisiana Creationism Act in violation of the Establishment Clause); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of Ten Commandments
in classrooms unconstitutional because of the statute's religious purpose).
158. Indeed, Justice Thomas warned that, after Mazurek, the Court would require "persuasive
proof" that a legislature had acted with an unconstitutional intent. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
1008 n.19 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, not all of the Justices appear to read Mazurek so
broadly. See id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting with approval Judge Posner's dissenting
opinion in Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting), in which he
concludes that the only possible legislative purpose of state abortion procedure ban was to express
hostility to abortion rights and therein finds an undue burden).
159. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, was
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each filed a
concurring opinion in which the other joined. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurrence. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia each filed his own dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.
160. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-328 (Supp. 1999). This ban applied to both pre-and post-viability
abortions 'in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child
before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery."' Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922 (quoting NEB.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999)).
161. Id. at 921.
162. Id. at 930.
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regulates the methods of abortion."' 163 The primacy of women's health has been
deeply embedded in abortion decisions since Roe; Stenberg confirmed Casey's
holding that the absence of a health exception in an abortion restriction
constitutes an independent ground for a holding of unconstitutionality.
In identifying an explicit statutory health exception as a sine qua non of
abortion restrictions whenever substantial medical authority deemed one
necessary, the Stenberg Court headed off a key strategy of abortion rights
opponents, who have long sought to narrow the application of the health
rationale'6 4 and downplay the importance of access to abortion for women's
health. In the view of the Stenberg dissenters, the health exception essentially
strips states of their authority to regulate physicians' abortion practice. 165 The
recognition of a right to any abortion procedure required to preserve a woman's
health or prevent damage to her health, according to the dissenters, opened an
ever-expanding loophole in abortion jurisprudence, investing the doctor with
unfettered and unreviewable discretion to perform whatever procedure he or
she deemed necessary for the health of the patient.1 66 Instead, they argued, any
exception for women's health-an exception which the dissenters thought
unnecessary to begin with 167-should be limited to the harm caused by
continuing the pregnancy, as opposed to the greater risk posed by alternative
abortion methods.
68
The second independent ground for the holding of unconstitutionality was
a finding that the procedure ban imposed an undue burden on women's ability
to choose D & E abortions,169 the most common second-trimester abortion
method, thus unduly burdening the right itself. Relying on Danforth,170 in
which an abortion procedure ban was held invalid under Roe's strict scrutiny
test, Justice Breyer found that Nebraska's prohibition of a range of abortion
163. Id. at 931 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
768-69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76-79 (1976); and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973), and noting that
"[o]ur holding does not go beyond those cases, as ratified in Casey") (internal quotation marks and
citation to Casey omitted).
164. See, e.g., Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under Casey,
states must make exceptions only for cases in which the life or health of the woman is threatened by
continuing the pregnancy).
165. See id. at 964-65, 972 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1012-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 964-65 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 965-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (crediting Nebraska's contention that there is never a
circumstance in which the banned procedure is the only procedure able to save a woman's life or
health).
168. Id. at 1009-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169. "D & E" or "dilation and evacuation" "' refers generically to transcervical procedures
performed at 13 weeks gestation or later."' Id. at 924 (quoting AM. MED. AS'N, REPORT OF BOARD OF
TRUSTEES ON LATE-TERM ABORTION app. 490 (1997)). The breech extraction version of an intact
dilation and evacuation or "intact D & E" procedure is known as a "D & X" or dilation and extraction
procedure. Id. at 927. Intact D & E abortions are variants of dilation and evacuation abortions. Id.
170. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a criminal
ban on saline induction abortions).
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methods constituted an undue burden, refusing to credit Nebraska's contention
that the statute would not have prevented a single abortion-it merely would
have sharply restricted the doctor's choice of method. Reasoning that a criminal
ban on the most common method of second-trimester abortion would foreclose
access to abortion altogether for some women, Justice Breyer determined that
the statute had the impermissible effect of "'placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.""l
7 1
It is difficult to read Stenberg without concluding that it significantly
strengthened Casey. Notably, Justice Breyer wrote for five members of the
Court, and while all but one of the concurring Justices wrote separate opinions,
none of them quarreled with the proposition that the Casey standard was the
controlling standard. Even Justice Kennedy, who disagreed with the majority's
application of the standard, agreed on this point. 172 Thus, for the first time, a
clear majority of the Court embraced a standard introduced by a three-Justice
plurality less than a decade earlier. Furthermore, in this facial challenge, the
Court did not require plaintiffs to prove that a large number of women would
be harmed by the procedure ban before enjoining the statute as a whole, again
implicitly rejecting the Salerno standard. 173 Perhaps most importantly, in
holding that the absence of a health exception constituted an independent
ground for invalidating an abortion restriction, the Stenberg Court placed
paramount value on the protection of women's health, and refused to define
that health interest narrowly.
A concurring opinion from Justice O'Connor illustrates the fragility of
Justice Breyer's majority. Justice O'Connor, the majority's fifth vote, made
clear that, had the Nebraska law contained an adequate health exception and
had it been limited to D & X abortions only, she would have sustained its
constitutionality. 174 Although six years have passed, neither Nebraska nor most
171. Id. at 938 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)); see also id. at 945-46 ("In sum, using
this law some present prosecutors and future Attorneys General may choose to pursue physicians who
use D & E procedures, the most commonly used method for performing previability second trimester
abortions. All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution,
conviction, and imprisonment. The result is an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion
decision. We must consequently find the statute unconstitutional.")
172. Justice Kennedy's dissent focused in large part on what he regarded as the majority's failure to
give effect to Casey's promise of increased deference to state legislative regulation of abortion. See id. at
956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[A] central premise [of Casey] was that the States retain a critical and
legitimate role in legislating on the subject of abortion .... ). The deference Justice Kennedy believes is
warranted is deference to "critical state interests" in regulating abortion procedures, id. at 957,
particularly abortion procedures performed late in pregnancy-not blind deference to legislators'
judgments about what may constitute an undue burden as a matter of law. Nowhere does Justice
Kennedy indicate that those judgments are not the proper province of the judiciary, nor does he suggest
that the courts should abandon their role in closely scrutinizing the purpose and effect of abortion
restrictions.
173. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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other states have accepted Justice O'Connor's advice. 175 Even the Federal
Abortion Procedure Ban Act, enacted years after Stenberg, lacks the health
exception that Stenberg requires, a fatal flaw in the eyes of the six federal
courts that have reviewed it to date. 
176
C. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England
The Stenberg Court did not agonize over the question of remedy, striking
down the statute in its entirety in the context of that facial challenge. Six years
later, with the composition of the Court ready to tip on a conservative fulcrum,
Justice O'Connor's opinion for an eerily unanimous Court in Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England177 left for another day any revisiting of
the undue burden standard.
Ayotte was a facial challenge to a New Hampshire parental notification
statute 178 prohibiting doctors from providing abortion services to minors until
48 hours had elapsed following the delivery of written notice of the abortion to
the patient's parent or guardian. Relying upon Stenberg, Casey, and Roe, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that this statute unduly burdened
those minors for whom parental notification was not possible. In addition, the
court of appeals looked to Stenberg's holding that an explicit health exception
was "a specific and independent constitutional requirement" for statutes
restricting abortion.' 79 The appeals court also determined that the statute's
judicial bypass procedure could not be deemed an adequate substitute for a
health exception.
180
The Supreme Court ruled on Ayotte in the brief window of time between
Justice O'Connor's announcement of her retirement and Justice Alito's
confirmation hearings. This narrow opinion had the cautious and placating tone
of a temporary truce. Like Stenberg, Ayotte led off with a reaffirmation of
Casey: "We do not revisit our abortion precedents today, but rather address a
175. See infra notes 339-344 and accompanying text for discussion of state abortion procedure bans
post-Stenberg.
176. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Gonzales v.
Carhart, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006) (No. 05-380); Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd in part sub nom. Nat'l Abortion
Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F.
Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
1163 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382); see infra Part IV.A.4 (discussing
lower courts' application of Stenberg).
177. 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
178. Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.24-28 (2006).
179. Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2004); see supra
Part III.B.
180. As an additional basis for its holding of unconstitutionality, the appeals court found that the
statute's exception for an abortion needed to save a pregnant woman's life was so vague that it would
have forced doctors to "gamble with their patients' lives" by prohibiting a life-saving abortion until
death was sufficiently certain or imminent. Heed, 390 F.3d at 63.
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question of remedy ... . Here, for the first time, a unanimous Court
acknowledged that Casey was the controlling standard, and conceded that,
"under our cases, it would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that
subjects minors to significant health risks."' 8 2 Thus embracing-or at least
acquiescing to-both the Casey undue burden standard and Stenberg's health
exception mandate, 18 and, for a third time, implicitly rejecting the Salerno
standard, 184 the Ayotte Court unanimously held that, as written, the New
Hampshire Act would violate the Constitution.
18 5
This ruling, however, cast into confusion the question of what remedies
would be available to plaintiffs in successful challenges to abortion restrictions.
The Court noted that in Stenberg, the parties did not ask for any remedy
narrower than the invalidation of the entire statute, guaranteeing through this
comment that such an omission is unlikely to happen again. In this case,
however, where New Hampshire had sought a narrower remedy that would
give at least partial effect to the statute, and where the constitutionality of
properly circumscribed parental notification provisions was not in doubt, the
Ayotte Court was willing to invalidate the defective statute in only some of its
applications: "If enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be
unconstitutional in medical emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial
response? We hold that invalidating the statute entirely is not always necessary
or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrower declaratory and
injunctive relief."'1 86 Apparently answering Justice Kennedy's concerns about
judicial overreaching that he voiced in his Stenberg dissent, 187 Justice
O'Connor reasoned:
Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a
statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for
example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute
while elevating other applications in force, or to sever its problematic
portions while leaving the remainder intact.... Only a few
applications of New Hampshire's parental notification statute would
present a constitutional problem. So long as they are faithful to
legislative intent, then, in this case the lower courts can issue a
181. Ayote, 126 S. Ct. at 964.
182. The Ayotte Court did not reach New Hampshire's defense that the judicial bypass alternative
created by the statute would suffice to protect the patient. Nor did it reach the lower court's alternative
holding that the statute's life exception was too narrow.
183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
185. Compare this acceptance of the Casey standard to Justice Thomas's vitriolic dissent in
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 982 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting), where he rejected the undue
burden standard as "illegitimate," "without historical or doctrinal pedigree," and not meriting adherence.
See also id. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Casey must be overruled.").
186. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 964.
187. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 978 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority and, even more so, the
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, ignore the settled rule against deciding unnecessary
constitutional questions.").
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declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the statute's
unconstitutional application. 188
Justice O'Connor was careful to insist that the limited injunction she was
directing the lower courts to impose on the New Hampshire statute could not
"entail quintessentially legislative work" and must be faithful to legislative
intent, cautioning lower courts not to "rewrit[e] state law to conform it to
constitutional requirements."' 89 With these cautions, the Court vacated and
remanded the First Circuit's judgment with instructions to determine whether a
limited injunction could save the statute's constitutionality or whether the
statute must, to remain consistent with legislative intent, be invalidated in toto.
Justice O'Connor avoided conflict within the Court by not ruling
definitively on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, thereby passing the question
of the law's ultimate constitutionality to the lower federal courts-many of
which, even before Ayotte, had been seeking greater guidance from the
Supreme Court on abortion questions. Such an approach arguably requires
lower courts to leave in place as much of an unconstitutional statute as possible
and even to "strive to salvage it"190 by repairing the constitutional defect
through judicial decree. The Ayotte compromise cannot be read in isolation
from the unique historical circumstances under which it arose, however, and
thus should not be interpreted as a general rule that courts must err on the side
of rescuing fragments of a constitutionally suspect statute. Rather, Ayotte can
be viewed as establishing a holding pattern in the area of parental involvement
regulations, a type of abortion restriction that the Court has repeatedly deemed
constitutionally permissible. Indeed, Ayotte is most notable for what it did not
do: adopt Salerno, retrench Casey, or retreat from Casey's and Stenberg's
emphasis on the paramount mandate to protect women's health.
D. Post-Casey Insights from Individual Justices
Individual opinions by the Casey joint opinion authors have signaled a
desire to ensure that the new standard offers meaningful protection to women's
abortion right. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly resolved the split
in authority over whether to apply Salerno's "no set of circumstances" test' 91 to
facial challenges of abortion statutes, individual Justices have repeatedly
addressed it. In a concurring opinion in Fargo Women's Health Organization v.
Schafer,192 Justices O'Conner and Souter, denying a motion for a stay and an
188. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 967-69 (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 968. Of course, if the lower federal courts were to misread Ayotte as a blanket
authorization for the judicial rewriting of unconstitutional abortion statutes, then the result would be a
federal judiciary that is highly disrespectful of the legislative sphere-quite the contrary to the deference
that Justice Kennedy had been seeking in Stenberg.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
192. 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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injunction pending appeal, clarified that facial challenges could be sustained
against abortion restrictions even if those restrictions could be constitutionally
applied to some women but not to others.
193 Using the language of Casey,
194
these Justices clearly repudiated the Salerno "no set of circumstances" standard
for facial challenges of abortion regulations. Instead, they reiterated Casey's
holding that "a law restricting abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence
is invalid, if, 'in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion."' 1 95 In addition, they clarified that the lower courts must "specifically
examine[] the record developed in the district court" through a fact-intensive
analysis of the particular restrictions at issue, rather than mechanically applying
the Supreme Court's Casey findings regarding the Pennsylvania statute.'
96
Dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Ada v. Guam Society of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'97 Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, would have granted review of the
Ninth Circuit judgment striking down a Guam statute that prohibited abortions
unless two physicians certified that the woman's life or health necessitated the
procedure. Justice Scalia opined that, because the Guam restriction could have
been applied constitutionally to post-viability abortions, under Salerno's "no
set of circumstances" test, the facial challenge to the Guam statute had to
fail. 198 The discussion continued in Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux
Falls Clinic.'99 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia reiterated
that the undue burden standard adopted in Casey did not displace Salerno,
while noting that the denial of certiorari relegated courts of appeals to "reading
the tea leaves of concurring opinions" to resolve the uncertainty over the
correct standard to apply in these cases.2° ° Justice Stevens concurred in the
denial of certiorari, and took the opportunity to blast the Salerno standard as
unduly onerous even outside the context of facial challenges to abortion
restrictions, dismissing Salerno's "no set of circumstances" language as merely
a "rhetorical flourish" that had resulted in a "rigid and unwise dictum"
unsupported by case law and unnecessary to Salerno's holding.2 °'
193. Id. at 1014.
194. See also Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) ("The proper focus
of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom it is
irrelevant.").
195. Schafer, 507 U.S. at 1013 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
196. Id. at 1014.
197. 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1011.
199. 517 U.S. 1174 (1996) (mem.).
200. Id. at 1177-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1175 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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IV. LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
In the years following the Casey decision, lower courts have had ample
opportunities to apply the undue burden standard to assess the constitutionality
of a wide range of restrictions on abortion. This Part analyzes the application of
the undue burden test in a sampling of district court and appellate opinions.
With several significant exceptions that reflect the potential vigor and strength
of the Casey standard, many lower federal courts have not been faithful to
Casey's promise. To be sure, the undue burden standard has provided airtight
protection against the efforts of states either to implement comprehensive
criminal bans on abortion 202 or to force women to notify husbands or
boyfriends before having an abortion. 203 With respect to other types of abortion
restrictions, however, challenges in the lower courts have had mixed results.
Some lower courts, especially those at the trial court level, have effectively
implemented the mandate of Casey and post-Casey decisions, applying the
undue burden standard in ways that afford meaningful protection to women
seeking abortion. These courts apply a contextualized, fact-intensive analysis
that acknowledges the current real-life challenges women face in accessing
reproductive health care services and gives careful consideration to the ways in
which the challenged restrictions exploit and exacerbate those realities and
thereby unduly burden access to abortion.
In contrast, in a significant number of cases, federal courts have repudiated
or misapplied the protections of Casey, manipulating the undue burden
standard in an incremental undermining of Roe. These courts demand
unattainably high levels of proof of undue burden, often requiring litigants to
establish their case to a statistical certainty. Many of these courts disregard
testimony illuminating how restrictions will affect disadvantaged women; filter
202. See, e.g., Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972
(1993) (holding Louisiana's criminal abortion ban unconstitutional); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp.
865 (D. Utah 1992), affid, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Leavitt v. Jane L., 520 U.S.
1274 (1997) (holding Utah's felony criminal abortion ban unconstitutional); Guam Soc'y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam App. Div. 1990), affid, 962 F.2d
1366 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding Guam's criminal abortion ban unconstitutional); see also supra note 39
(discussing post-Webster reenactment of pre-Roe criminal abortion bans). In 2006, both Louisiana and
South Dakota reenacted criminal bans on abortion. See supra note 17.
203. See, e.g., Coe v. County of Cook, No. 96 C 2636, 1997 WL 797662 (N.D. I11. Dec. 24, 1997),
aff d, 162 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a claim against a county hospital that performed an
abortion on the plaintiffs girlfriend without notifying him); Jane L., 809 F. Supp. 865 (holding Utah's
husband-notification requirement unconstitutional); see also Stachokus v. Meyers, No. 67E-2002 (Pa.
Ct. Com. P1., Aug. 5, 2002) (citing Casey as authority for vacating an injunction obtained by a man
preventing his girlfriend from obtaining abortion care and prohibiting providers from serving her)
(unreported decision on file with the authors). Prior to the Casey decision, there were more reported
decisions of legal challenges by boyfriends, but none proved successful. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 486
U.S. 1308 (1988) (Stevens, Circuit Justice); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Doe v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 1988); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128
(Mass. 1974); Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Steinhoffv. Steinhoff,
531 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Larrimore v. Doe, 4 Pa. D. & C.4th 186 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1989).
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evidence of extreme hardship through the lens of privilege; fail to consider how
challenged restrictions will operate when compounded by other restrictions; or
mechanically apply the purpose or effects prong to restrictions similar to those
at issue in Casey without any analysis of the record before them. This approach
represents a trend that is inconsistent with Casey and post-Casey decisions and
poses a serious threat to meaningful protection for reproductive autonomy.
A. Implementation of the Effects Prong
Most post-Casey legal challenges have been facial challenges that seek to
demonstrate that the challenged restrictions will have an actual improper effect
on women's access to abortion. This section contrasts the varying approaches
of the lower courts in assessing these claims in facial challenges to waiting
periods, state-prescribed counseling provisions, abortion procedure bans, and
laws that impose civil liability and a variety of licensing and other requirements
on abortion providers.
20 4
1. Inconsistency in the Standard for Facial Challenges
The vast majority of circuits that have addressed the issue have rejected the
Salerno "no set of circumstances" standard 20 5 for facial challenges and,
consistent with Casey and other Supreme Court abortion precedents, have not
required a showing that the challenged restrictions are unduly burdensome in
206all circumstances. However, the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly
repudiate the Salerno standard has been interpreted by courts in both the Fifth
and Fourth Circuits as leaving the door open to its use in facial challenges to
abortion restrictions.
204. For a thorough analysis of post-Casey lower court rulings on parental involvement laws, see
Amanda M. Lanham, Parental Notification Under the Undue Burden Standard: Is a Bypass Mechanism
Required?, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 551 (2006); see also Jennifer Blasdell, Symposium, Mother, May I?:
Ramifications for Parental Involvement Laws for Minors Seeking Abortion Services, 10 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 287 (2002) (criticizing the Supreme Court's standards for evaluating parental
involvement laws because they fail to adequately protect the rights of minors); Martin Guggenheim,
Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 589 (2002) (same).
205. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2004)
(rejecting a Salerno facial challenge standard in the abortion context), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v.
Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187, 193-96 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (same); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102
F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 520 U.S. 1274 (1997)
(same); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456-58 (8th Cir. 1995) (same),
cert. denied sub nom. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); see
also A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Brizzi, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003) (reconciling the
conflict between Salerno and Stenberg/Casey by holding that Salerno applies).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the Salerno standard in
post-Casey abortion challenges.207 In Barnes v. Moore, for example, the court,
shortly after Casey, upheld Mississippi's mandatory waiting period and biased
counseling provision. 20 8  Acknowledging, but disregarding, the Casey
analysis, 9 the court insisted that the Salerno standard controlled and therefore
denied the plaintiff-providers the opportunity to put on factual evidence of the
specific burdens imposed on Mississippi women by these provisions. Instead,
the Court reasoned that the Casey outcome controlled because the Mississippi
provisions were substantially the same as Pennsylvania's, and therefore
plaintiffs could not satisfy the "heavy burden" of the Salerno standard.
2 10
Although a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
211rejected the Salerno standard, other opinions of that court have embraced the
Salerno standard in assessing challenges to laws requiring parental consent 21
and imposing licensing and other requirements on abortion providers.
2 13
207. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the Salerno
standard and upholding a mandatory waiting period and biased counseling provision); Barnes v. Moore,
970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
208. Barnes, 970 F.2d at 14. In recent years, however, some Fifth Circuit panels have expressed
doubts about the applicability of Salerno. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1999)
(declining to decide applicability of Salerno facial challenge standard in striking down Louisiana's civil
liability statute because statute was unconstitutional under both Salerno and Casey), rev 'd on other
grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); Causeway Med. Suite v. leyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1104 (5th Cit.
1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 943 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d
405 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to decide the applicability of Salerno in striking down parental consent
law because statute was unconstitutional under both Salerno and Casey, but noting it would be "ill-
advised" to assume that the Supreme Court would abandon Salerno); see also Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1176
n.2 (Stevens, J., on denial of certiorari) ("[Ilit is not at all clear to me ... that subsequent Fifth Circuit
panels would follow Barnes' application of the 'no circumstance' test .. ") (citation omitted).
209. See Barnes, 970 F.2d at 14 n.2 ("The Casey joint opinion may have applied a somewhat
different standard in striking down the spousal notification provision .... Nevertheless, we do not
interpret Casey as having overruled, sub silentio, longstanding Supreme Court precedent governing
challenges to the facial constitutionality of statutes.") (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 14 ("In light of Casey's holding substantially identical provisions of the Pennsylvania
Act facially constitutional, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy this 'heavy burden."').
211. Richmond Medical Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding,
in striking down abortion procedure ban, "that Salerno does not govern facial challenges to abortion
regulations").
212. See Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 268 n.4 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that, until the Supreme
Court overrules Salerno in the abortion context, "this Court is bound to apply the Salerno standard");
see also Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant (Greenville 1), 222 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir.) (noting that
Manning's discussion of Salerno was not dictum "because application of Salerno was necessary to the
ruling in that case"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2000); Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v.
Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 358-59 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("Because we conclude.., that [Virginia's
parental notification law] is facially constitutional under either the Salerno or the Casey standard, we
need not, and do not, decide which of these two standards applies in facial challenges to abortion
statutes."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1140 (1999).
213. See, e.g., Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 317
F.3d 357, 361-63 (4th Cir. 2002) (Greenville I) (applying Salerno in the context of a claim that South
Carolina abortion clinic licensing standards allowed for the standardless delegation of medical licensing
to third parties); Greenville 1, 222 F.3d at 164-65 (reviewing South Carolina abortion clinic licensing
standards under both Salerno and Casey and finding them constitutional).
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These decisions are directly at odds with the application of the undue
burden standard in both Casey and Stenberg, in which the Supreme Court
assessed the challenged provisions to determine whether they operated as a
substantial obstacle in those cases in which they were relevant.2 14 Thus, under
Casey and Stenberg, the mere existence of some valid application of the
challenged abortion restrictions does not preclude a pre-enforcement facial
challenge if the restrictions pose an undue burden for some women. This
analysis, which some commentators have called the functional equivalent of
First Amendment substantial overbreadth review,215 serves the vital function of
protecting women against the deterrent effect of laws that by their very
existence imperil women's ability to exercise the constitutional right to
abortion. In voiding Pennsylvania's husband-notification provision on its face,
for example, the Casey joint opinion emphasized that the very existence of the
notification requirement chilled women in the exercise of their rights: "Whether
the prospect of notification itself deters ... women from seeking abortions, or
whether the husband ... prevents his wife from obtaining an abortion uhtil it is
too late, the notice requirement will often be tantamount to the veto found
unconstitutional in Danforth.,,21 6 Allowing pre-enforcement facial challenges to
such restrictions is essential given the practical reality that the very women
most heavily burdened by them would likely not come forward to vindicate
their rights.2 17 In precluding facial challenges, decisions such as the Fifth
Circuit's in Barnes v. Moore force these women to choose between sacrificing
their right to abortion and enduring restrictions that threaten their health and
safety.
214. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992); see also Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000) ("All those who perform abortion procedures using [the D & E]
method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. The result is an undue burden.").
215. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 47, at 271-76 (arguing that the chilling effect that justifies First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine also justifies its application in abortion and other privacy
jurisprudence).
216. Casey, 505 U.S. at 897; see also id. at 894 ("[T]he significant number of women who fear for
their safety ... are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth
had outlawed abortion in all cases.").
217. As one court recognized, the alternative of waiting until a mandatory waiting period takes
effect and then mounting an as-applied challenge is unsatisfactory: "[flor women for whom making two
trips would pose a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, the same factors (plus the later birth of a
child) make it unlikely that they would step forward to testify about those burdens." A Woman's Choice-
E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1448 (S.D. Ind. 1995); see also Brief for
Respondents, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (No. 04-1144) at 32
(arguing that "many women with meritorious constitutional claims would not or could not come forward
to seek vindication of their rights" and that precluding a facial challenge "would unconscionably force
women to choose between risking their safety and foregoing their right to an abortion.").
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2. The Special Difficulties of Challenging Provisions Similar to Those
Upheld in Casey: Mandatory Waiting Periods and Counseling
Provisions
In the years following Casey, numerous legal challenges have been
mounted to an ever-increasing number of mandatory waiting periods and
counseling provisions2 18 modeled on those upheld in Casey. As the district
court properly recognized in A Woman's Choice-East Side Women 's Clinic v.
Newman,2 1 9 the proper analysis in assessing challenges to these provisions is
whether, based on the specific evidentiary record, they are likely to unduly
burden those women affected by them. Most other courts, however, have made
the mistake of mechanically imposing Casey's result, rather than applying its
undue burden analysis to assess these provisions. 220 For this reason, these
challenges have met with very limited success in the lower courts even where
the challengers have supported their claims with compelling evidence of the
burdensome effects of these laws that was not available at the time of Casey.
221
Some lower courts-though ostensibly rejecting the use of the Salerno
formulation adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Barnes 222-have misconstrued
Casey's application of the undue burden standard to Pennsylvania's mandatory
218. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
219. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied
sub nom. A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Brizzi, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003); see discussion
infra notes 260-280 and accompanying text.
220. These decisions are significant both because they have foreclosed most challenges to waiting
periods and because the methodological errors in them have been transported to courts' analyses of other
kinds of abortion restrictions.
221. Indeed, our research found only three cases with reported decisions not subsequently reversed
on appeal that have invalidated these provisions on federal constitutional privacy grounds. See Summit
Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (issuing a permanent
injunction against the application of biased counseling provision to women diagnosed with ectopic
pregnancies and women carrying fetuses with fatal anomalies because "the state interests identified in
Casey are not served" by providing these women with information about the father's liability for child
support and alternatives to abortion); Planned Parenthood of Del. v. Brady, 250 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409-10
(D. Del. 2003) (issuing a preliminary injunction against a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period
because the narrow health exception unduly burdened women seeking abortions in violation of Casey);
Planned Parenthood of Del. v. Brady, No. 03-153-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10099 (D. Del. June 9,
2003) (same, but issuing a permanent injunction); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38
S.W.3d 1, 22-24 (Tenn. 2000) (invalidating a two-day waiting period on both state constitutional
grounds and Casey's undue burden standard). In other cases, challenges against these provisions have
been successful on state constitutional grounds or non-privacy federal constitutional grounds such as
vagueness. See, e.g., Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Nixon, 428
F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2005) (partially affirming order preliminarily enjoining Missouri's biased counseling
requirement on vagueness grounds under the Federal Constitution); Planned Parenthood Minn. v.
Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 2005) (issuing preliminary injunction against South Dakota's
biased counseling provision because it violated the Federal Constitution's First Amendment); Planned
Parenthood of Missoula v. Montana, No. BDV 95-722, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1117 (Mont. Dist. Mar.
12, 1999) (enjoining enforcement of Montana's twenty-four-hour waiting period on state constitutional
privacy grounds).
222. See supra notes 208-217 and accompanying text.
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waiting period and counseling provisions as establishing, if not a per se rule, at
least a strong presumption that these provisions are valid in the context of facial
challenges. In an especially egregious example of this approach, the district
court in Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt 23 failed to undertake an
individualized analysis of the unique burdens posed to Utah women by that
state's mandatory waiting period, reasoning that "[b]ecause the two visit
requirement is constitutional in Pennsylvania, it must also be constitutional in
Utah-especially in the context of a facial challenge." 224 While conceding that
"Casey did not purport to create a per se rule as to the constitutionality of
future abortion legislation," the court summarily concluded that Casey
controlled the outcome because plaintiffs' complaint contained "no factual
allegations materially different from those already considered" in Casey.
225
Remarkably, without looking beyond the four comers of the complaint, the
court summarily dismissed the possibility that the number and location of
abortion services in Utah, and other specific circumstances, might render the
forced waiting period more burdensome for Utah women than Pennsylvania
women due to substantially longer travel distances and consequent increases in
226cost and delay. The court also sharply criticized plaintiffs for bringing the
case227 and went so far as to sanction the plaintiffs' attorneys for challenging
the Utah law, ordering them to pay attorney's fees and costs228 -an order
reversed on appeal.229 Likewise, in Fargo Women's Health Organization v.
Sinner, 23  a challenge to North Dakota's waiting period and counseling
223. 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994), rev'd in part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1019 (1996).
224. Id. at 1487. Although the court noted that the statute could be interpreted "to allow for
telephonic communication," which would eliminate the burdens posed by forcing women to make two
trips to the abortion provider, it concluded that this interpretation "is not necessary to uphold the
constitutionality of the law under Casey." Id.; see also id. at 1489 ("[Pjlaintiffs could not.., have
argued in good faith that the Utah law had to allow for telephone communication in order to be
constitutional in light of Casey's constitutional validation of two face-to-face visits.").
225. 1d. at 1490. But see id. (acknowledging that a state law with similar restrictions to Casey could
be held unconstitutional if circumstances in the forum state were materially different from those in
Pennsylvania).
226. Id. at 1491 n. 11. The Court reasoned that "the most severe burden imposed by the waiting
period is the same for women in both Utah and Pennsylvania-an overnight stay at a location near the
clinic." Id.
227. Id. ("Plaintiffs had no case from the beginning" because "[u]nder the broad scope of Casey, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to bring a good faith facial challenge .... ); id. at 1488
("An informed consent requirement which requires two visits is simply not a substantial obstacle, as
stated by the Supreme Court in Casey."). While deciding that it would apply the analysis of Casey,
rather than Salerno, id. at 1489, the court nevertheless criticized plaintiffs for arguing that the relevant
class of women should be limited "to those women who are particularly burdened by the law," id. at
1489 n.9. The court insisted that "[s]uch a construction ... turns the facial challenge analysis on its
head. It is no test at all. If the class is drawn too narrowly, a finding of undue burden in one abberational
[sic] circumstance would be enough to strike down the law." Id.
228. Id. at 1495.
229. See Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 136 F.3d. 707 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
230. 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993), affd sub nom. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18
F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994). In affirming the district court's entry of summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted the North Dakota statute as not requiring that the state-
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provision, the district court employed a similarly cursory analysis. It granted
summary judgment without any factual findings or analysis of .the specific
burdens posed by the law on North Dakota women, based entirely on the
surface similarities between the Pennsylvania provision upheld in Casey and
the Mississippi provision upheld in Barnes.
231
The refusal of these courts to undertake a fact-intensive analysis in
applying the undue burden standard is a betrayal of Casey. Indeed, as noted
above, Justice O'Connor took pains to reject this approach in her separate
concurrence in Fargo.232 In carefully limiting its findings on the Pennsylvania
waiting period and counseling provisions to the record before it,233 and
specifically acknowledging the "closer question" posed by these provisions,
234
the Casey joint opinion makes clear that its analysis is not a template for similar
provisions in other states. Casey's fact-intensive analysis protects women's
access to abortion by ensuring that regulations not deemed burdensome based
on the limited record before the Court in Casey may still be invalidated if they
prove burdensome in states with fewer abortion providers; longer travel
distances between clinics; more costly abortion procedures; poorer populations;
and other unique social, economic, and geographic circumstances.
2 35
While other courts have undertaken a somewhat more searching, fact-
intensive review than the Leavitt and Fargo courts, they nonetheless misapply
the Casey standard, imposing unreasonably heavy burdens of proof on
plaintiffs. In Eubanks v. Schmidt,236 for example, the district court found that
Kentucky's mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period and counseling
provision, which it assumed would require two visits for some women, did not
constitute an undue burden. While recognizing that Casey "[did] not preordain
mandated information be given in person, thus eliminating the burden on women of making two trips to
the abortion provider. Schafer, 18 F.3d at 533. On this basis, the court found that the statute did not pose
an undue burden within the meaning of Casey. Id. A dissenting opinion criticized the panel for failing to
require the district court to "hold an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings as to whether the
North Dakota provisions in question create such an undue burden." Id. at 536 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
231. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. at 865 ("Though it may be true that
'North Dakota ain't Pennsylvania,' and while the court is not unsympathetic to the burdens a woman
may face when seeking to have an abortion in North Dakota, 'differences between the [North Dakota]
and Pennsylvania Acts are not sufficient to render the former unconstitutional on its face.") (quoting
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir. 1992)). Unlike the Leavitt court, the Eighth Circuit in Sinner
applied the Salerno standard for facial challenges, see id. at 864-65.
232. Schafer, 507 U.S. at 1014; see supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
234. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992); see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
235. The shortage of reproductive health care providers in Pennsylvania, for example, is
significantly less severe than the shortages in either Utah or North Dakota. In 2000, Pennsylvania had 73
abortion providers; in contrast, Utah had 4 and North Dakota had 2 providers. Finer & Henshaw, supra
note 18, at 10. In 2000, 75 percent of Pennsylvania counties did not have an abortion provider; 93
percent of Utah counties and 98 percent of North Dakota counties were without abortion providers in the
same year. Id.
236. 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
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[the] result ' 237 in the case, the court nevertheless insisted that Casey established
"a presumption of constitutionality" with regard to those provisions it
upheld.238 In failing to find significant differences in the burdens imposed by
the Pennsylvania and Kentucky laws, the court seriously misapplied the Casey
undue burden analysis by forcing the plaintiff-providers to prove that the
statute would operate as a substantial obstacle for those women who "could
have obtained an abortion under the old [law], but who cannot under the new
[law]., 239 The court entirely eliminated from consideration those Kentucky
women most disadvantaged by poverty and other circumstances because "[f]or
those women already so affected that they cannot obtain an abortion, the
Statute changes little." 24° Having eliminated this group of women, the court
found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the Kentucky waiting period unduly
burdened a sufficient number of women to meet the Casey standard24 1 because
it "does not fundamentally alter any of the significant preexisting burdens
facing poor women who are distant from abortion providers."
242
This approach is deeply flawed. The Casey joint opinion made clear that in
measuring the constitutionality of restrictive abortion laws, the proper focus is
"its impact on those whose conduct it affects." 243 The joint opinion nowhere
counsels that in assessing this impact courts should ignore preexisting
conditions in women's lives that already make it difficult to obtain abortions.
Indeed, in invalidating the husband-notification provision, the joint opinion
recognized that it is these very conditions-poverty, violence, underlying
health problems-that may turn certain abortion restrictions into substantial
obstacles for some, and not other, women. The Eubanks analysis, in contrast,
uses a woman's difficult life circumstances against her. A far fairer and more
meaningful constitutional inquiry "is whether the obstacle or burden is,
considered from [the woman's] perspective, significant or substantial. To
demand more is to turn logic on its head, effectively holding that the most
desperate among us can, because of that, be burdened the most."
244
While Eubanks analyzed the weight of the burden placed on women by
forcing them to hear state-mandated information in person, other courts have
rejected challenges to mandatory waiting periods based on a finding that the
physician-patient counseling can be done over the telephone, thereby
237. Id. at 453.
238. Id. at 457.
239. Id. at 456.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also rejected plaintiffs' reliance on a Mississippi study
showing a decline in the number of women having abortions after the implementation of that state's
mandatory waiting period. Id. at 456-57; see infra note 261.
243. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992); see supra notes 83-92 and
accompanying text.
244. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 137.
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eliminating the requirement of two trips to the provider.245 This outcome might
be justified on some factual records. Here again, however, some courts
woodenly apply the result in Casey, concluding that because the restriction is
less burdensome on its face than the two-visit provision upheld in Casey, it
must therefore pose no undue burden. In Planned Parenthood v. Miller, for
example, the district court relied heavily on Casey in dismissing a challenge to
a physician-only counseling requirement, summarily rejecting plaintiffs' proof
of an undue burden on the women of South Dakota. 24 6 Plaintiffs' evidence,
however, established that South Dakota had only one abortion provider in the
entire state and that requiring that doctor to make the required telephone calls
would take him seven hours per week, thereby increasing the cost of each
247abortion by sixty dollars. The court made factual findings that South
Dakota's poverty rate exceeded the national average and that seventeen percent
of patients traveled 300 miles or more each way to reach an abortion
provider. 248 However, the court did not evaluate the impact that this cost
increase would have on teenagers, poor women, or those who lived long
distances from South Dakota's sole abortion provider. Instead, the court
seemed to assume that the cost increase-which it apparently viewed as modest
or capable of being reduced 249-would affect all women equally, ignoring the
real differences in the lives and vulnerability of middle- and upper-class
women as compared to low-income women, teenagers, domestic violence
survivors, and others disparately affected by the cost increase.25 °
251In Cincinnati Women 's Services v. Taft, the court considered evidence of
an even larger projected increase in the cost of an abortion, which resulted from
Ohio's mandatory waiting period; it found that implementation of Ohio's law
"would increase the cost of an abortion by about $100," which would represent
245. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533 (8th Cir. 1994); Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409, 1420-21 (D.S.D. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 1452
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996).
Six states require that state-mandated information be delivered in person to the woman, while others
allow the required information to be provided by other means, including telephone, mail or fax, rather
than in person. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MANDATORY COUNSELING AND
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION 1-2 (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spibMWPA.pdf.
246. Miller, 860 F. Supp. at 1420-21.
247. Id. at 1414, 1420.
248. Id. at 1414.
249. The court seemed to discount the likelihood of an increase in the cost of abortion services,
conjecturing that the doctor "personally would not necessarily have to contact all of his patients"
because South Dakota allows for the referring physician to give the woman this information. Id. at 1420.
However, the court made no findings as to how many women are actually referred by another doctor to
South Dakota's abortion provider or how much the involvement of referring physicians would affect the
projected cost increase.
250. In affirming the district court, as in Fargo v. Schafer, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit again relied heavily on the similarities between the South Dakota provision and both the
Pennsylvania provisions at issue in Casey and the North Dakota provisions upheld in its Schafer
opinion. See Miller, 63 F.3d at 1467.
251. No. 1:98-CV-289, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23015 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2005).
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a twenty-five percent increase over the current cost of the procedure. 252 In
concluding that this substantial cost increase did not amount to an undue
burden, as in Miller, the court engaged in no analysis of the actual impact of
this substantial increase on teenagers, poor women, and other vulnerable Ohio
women. Rather, citing Casey, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron,
and lower court decisions including Miller, the court summarily concluded that
the hundred dollar cost increase "does not create an undue burden on the right
to obtain an abortion."
253
The Taft and Miller courts both misapplied Casey in their treatment of cost
increases. In its analysis of both the Pennsylvania waiting period and
recordkeeping provisions, the Casey joint opinion acknowledges that increases
in the cost of abortion services that result from abortion laws can amount to an
undue burden if they impose substantial obstacles on women's access to
abortion.2 54 Although Casey found that the Pennsylvania provisions did not
amount to an undue burden, it did so based on a record that did not contain
specific fact-findings documenting the kind of cost increases found in either
255Taft or Miller. Moreover, under Casey, cost increases must be carefully
assessed based on the empirical record before the court to determine if they
amount to a substantial obstacle from the perspective of the women and girls
actually affected and taking into account the context of poverty and other real
life circumstances in which the increases occur. Indeed, lower courts' failure to
assess the burdens posed by abortion restrictions from this contextualized
perspective inevitably leads many of them to minimize the effect of cost
increases. As Professors Estrich and Sullivan argued with respect to Justice
O'Connor's initial formulation of the undue burden test:
Because Justice O'Connor's test is based on the obstacle to the woman
making the abortion decision, the only appropriate perspective for
assessing the burden is that woman's .... [T]he question here is not
whether a judge or a legislator or the law's perennial "reasonable man"
would judge an increase in cost or requirement of notification to be a
252. Id. at *23-24.
253. Id. at *33.
254. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992); id. at 886-87; see also
supra notes 97-98, 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing the Casey joint opinion's analysis of the
significance of cost increases under the undue burden standard).
255. With regard to the Pennsylvania recordkeeping and reporting requirements, the district court
found that "there was no testimony which suggests that any of the plaintiff-clinics have raised the fees
for an abortion because of these added expenses." Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1990). With
regard to Pennsylvania's forced waiting period, the district court found that in some cases, delays caused
by the waiting period "will push patients into the second trimester... substantially increasing the cost of
the procedure itself ..... Id. at 1352. The district court also found that "[i]f the physician-only
disclosure requirements become law, the added costs incurred by abortion providers will be imposed
upon the women seeking abortions." Id. at 1353. The district court made no other specific factual
findings regarding price increases in the cost of the abortion procedure resulting from the
implementation of the waiting period and counseling provisions.
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"drastic limit." The question is whether a pregnant woman, or girl,
would.
It is not simply a matter of a man's perspective versus a woman's
or, all too often, a girl's. Unwanted pregnancies strike harder at the
poor and the young than at comfortable adults. Inadequate health care,
incomplete birth control information, and violence and abuse, are far
more common realities for poor and young women than for middle
class adults. Moreover, while a $50 difference in cost may appear
modest to most members of the Supreme Court, whose families are
insured in any event, it is a lifetime's savings for a teenage girl. To
forget her perspective could, quite literally, cost her life.
2 56
Moreover, the lower courts' tendency to examine each restriction individually
has minimized their impression of the actual impact of the restrictions on real
women. As commentators have recognized, "restrictions that, considered one
by one by a court, may not appear undue are not experienced that way by a
woman seeking an abortion." 257 Rather, women often experience the cost
increases and delays caused by mandatory waiting periods and counseling
provisions in conjunction with a raft of other restrictions that limit access to
abortion. Thus, as Walter Dellinger and Gene Sperling have argued, it is
essential that courts develop a mechanism for assessing "how a given
regulation incrementally adds to the cumulative burden" on the right to
abortion. 258 Ignoring these cumulative burdens effectively "allow[s] a state to
pile on 'reasonable regulation' after 'reasonable regulation' until a woman
seeking an abortion first [has] to conquer a multi-faceted obstacle course. 259
Finally, in one especially noteworthy instance, a challenge to a waiting
period was successful at the trial level and then reversed on appeal. The case, A
Woman 's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 26 stands out because
of both the district court's thorough evaluation of the factual record and the
heavy burden of proof that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit placed
on plaintiffs, while giving no deference to the factual inferences drawn by the
district court. In Newman, the plaintiffs challenged an Indiana law that required
women to obtain state-mandated information in person eighteen hours in
advance of their abortions. The trial record contained evidence, unavailable in
Casey, of what had actually occurred in two other states-Mississippi and
256. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 136-37 (citation omitted); see also TRIBE, supra note 33,
at 250 ("[U]nless the 'undue burden' test is applied with sensitivity to the circumstances of actual
women in the real world, many burdens that from an Olympian judicial perspective might appear to be
molehills are in fact massive obstacles to choice."); Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 35, at 99 (arguing
that under undue burden analysis "the Court bears a strong responsibility to avoid purely theoretical
judgments and instead to make a practical inquiry about whether abortion regulations operate, alone or
together, as a significant burden").
257. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 30, at 137.
258. Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 35, at 100.
259. Id.
260. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1192 (2003).
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Utah-when women were forced as a result of this requirement to make two
261trips to the clinic. Because the Indiana law had been permitted to take effect
subject to a preliminary injunction enjoining the requirement that the
information be delivered to the woman in person, 262 the record also contained.
evidence of the mandated information's lack of persuasive effect as well as
similar evidence from other states.
263
In vivid contrast to the cursory analysis undertaken by other trial courts,
the Newman district court engaged in a careful evaluation of the factual record
to determine whether the in-person requirement unduly burdened those Indiana
women affected by it. The court emphasized at the outset that Casey and lower
court rulings from other states did not "control the validity of Indiana's law"
because "different results may occur either because new evidence is presented
regarding the actual effects of such laws, or perhaps because of demographic or
geographic factors unique to a particular state." 264 After a thorough analysis of
the record evidence and careful consideration of the objections to the validity of
this evidence, the court concluded that Indiana's in-person requirement posed
an undue burden because it would likely reduce by ten to thirteen percent the
number of abortions performed in Indiana and significantly increase both the
number of second-trimester abortions and the number of Indiana women
traveling to other states to have abortions.265 This effect would result not from
the persuasive effects of the information provided but from "the substantial
obstacles the law creates for a substantial fraction of [Indiana] women.
266
Specifically, the court found that, after the implementation of similar laws, the
number of abortions in Mississippi dropped by approximately ten to thirteen.... 267
percent and Utah showed similar decreases. 2 Based on the expert testimony in
the case, the court found that the "results in Mississippi provide[d] a reasonable
261. This evidence included a peer-reviewed Mississippi study, published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association, which studied the effects of Mississippi's 1992 requirement that women
receive state-mandated information in person and then wait at least twenty-four hours before the
abortion procedure. See Theodore Joyce, Stanley K. Henshaw & Julia D. Skatrud, The Impact of
Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law on Abortions and Births, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 653 (1997). The
study compared abortion rates in the year before and after the Mississippi law went into effect and found
that the total rate of abortions for Mississippi residents decreased by approximately 16%; the proportion
of Mississippi residents traveling to other states to obtain abortions increased by 37%; and the
proportion of second-trimester abortions among all Mississippi women obtaining abortions increased by
40%. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62. The record also contained extensive evidence of the effects
of Utah's in-person counseling and twenty-four-hour delay requirements, which took effect in 1996. Id.
at 1172. This evidence showed that the rate of abortions per one thousand women declined in Utah by
9.3% from 1995 to 1997. Id.
262. See A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (granting a preliminary injunction); A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 980
F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (modifying a preliminary injunction to allow the informed consent
provision to take effect and directing that the mandatory information can be provided by telephone).
263. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
264. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
265. Id. at 1175.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1173.
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basis for predicting estimated results in Indiana." 268 According to the court, the
evidence showed that implementation of Indiana's law without its in-person
requirement demonstrated that the information provided to women had no
persuasive effect at all.269
In a split decision reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit emphasized throughout its opinion that "the pre-enforcement
nature of this suit" placed a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show why it should
"depart from the holding of Casey that an informed consent law is valid even
when compliance entails two visits to the medical provider." 270 The court of
appeals found that the district court had improperly relied on evidence from
states other than Indiana in finding that the undue burden standard had been
met.
Although Salerno does not foreclose all pre-enforcement challenges to
abortion laws, it is an abuse of discretion for a district judge to issue a
pre-enforcement injunction while the effects of the law (and reasons
for those effects) are open to debate. What happened in Mississippi
and Utah does not imply that the effects in Indiana are bound to be
unconstitutional, so Indiana (like Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) is
entitled to put its law into effect and have that law judged by its own
271
consequences.
"Indiana," the court of appeals insisted, "is entitled to an opportunity to have its
law evaluated in light of experience in Indiana."
272
While admitting that it had found no clear error in any of the district
273court's fact-findings, the court of appeals repeatedly questioned the
268. Id. at 1173-74.
269. Id. at 1175. Indeed, the district court noted that the record contained testimony indicating that
the state-scripted information encouraged some women to obtain abortions. Id. (noting that "a witness
from Planned Parenthood showed that giving the information over the telephone caused an increase in
the 'show rate' for his organization's clinics, thus indicating the startling result that the state-mandated
information tends to persuade women to have more abortions than they otherwise would"). The district
court found that the presence of this concrete evidence of the lack of any persuasive effect of the Indiana
law distinguished the record in Newman from the record in Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D.
Wisc. 1997), ajfd in part, rev 'd in part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999); see Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d. at
1177-78. The plaintiffs in Karlin, a challenge to Wisconsin's mandatory waiting period and informed
consent law, also relied on the Mississippi study. In Karlin, the District Court found that the Mississippi
study failed to prove that the drop in abortions in Mississippi was attributable to the unconstitutional,
rather than the persuasive, effects of the Mississippi law. See Karlin, 975 F. Supp. at 1217-18; see also
Karlin, 188 F.3d at 487-88 (noting that the "most significant shortcoming" in the Mississippi study was
its failure to control for persuasive effect); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (W.D. Ky.
2000) (finding that the Mississippi study did not prove why "some women who are forced to wait
twenty-four hours ultimately [do] not have an abortion").
270. See A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 690-92 (7th Cir.
2002). Judge Easterbrook authored the opinion for the court, id. at 684-93, Judge Coffey wrote a lengthy
concurring opinion, id. at 693-704, and Judge Wood dissented, id. at 704-17. The court of appeals
subsequently denied rehearing en banc in a 5-5 vote. A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v.
Newman, No. 01-217, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22601 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2002).
271. Newman, 305 F.3d at 693 (first emphasis added).
272. id. at 692.
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inferences drawn from the facts by the district court and substituted its own
inferences. 274 The appeals court, for example, rejected the district court's
inference that the effects observed in Mississippi and Utah were likely to occur
in Indiana and offered its own alternative explanation drawn not from record
evidence but from pure speculation:
Maybe... Indiana differs from Mississippi and Utah and will not
experience a substantial decline [in the number of abortions], with or
without multiple visits. Or maybe what it shows is that presenting the
information in person is critical to its persuasive effect .... [T]he fact
that Indiana has been blocked from enforcing its laws as written means
that the record does not contain evidence needed for accurate
assessment of that statute's effects.
275
The court of appeals' opinion in Newman is troubling in several respects.
The court misapplied Casey by placing a virtually insurmountable burden of
proof on plaintiffs in a pre-enforcement facial challenge. While ostensibly
rejecting Salerno,276 the court demanded airtight proof--or certainly proof not
"open to debate"-that the Indiana law was "bound to" affect Indiana women
in an unconstitutional manner. 277 But, in striking down the Pennsylvania
spousal notification provision, the Casey plurality did not require a finding that
the unconstitutional effects of that statute were inevitable and indisputable;
rather the joint opinion found, based on inferences drawn from the factual
findings of the district court and published empirical studies of domestic
violence, that forced notification was "likely to prevent a significant number of
women from obtaining an abortion., 278 Moreover, in requiring proof that is not
"open to debate" the court of appeals rejected the very evidence that would best
prove the likely unconstitutional effects of Indiana's law in a pre-enforcement
challenge-i.e., evidence from other states that have already implemented an
in-person counseling requirement. Predictions about how women of Indiana
273. Id. at 689 ("[Wie cannot say that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. The
studies' conclusions were hotly debated on both medical and statistical grounds, but the district judge
dealt responsibly with these arguments pro and con, and his findings cannot be upset.").
274. See id. at 689-91. The majority reasoned that the question of "what is likely to happen in
Indiana" is an "admixture of fact and law" and therefore could be reviewed "without deference." Id. at
689.
275. Id. at 690 (first and third emphases added).
276. Id. at 687 ("Given the incompatibility between Salerno's language and Stenberg's holding, it
is the language of Salerno that must give way.").
277. Id. at 693. Indeed, Judge Wood believed that the standard applied by the majority was, in fact,
the Salerno standard or "something very close to it" because "[iln essence, it holds that a state statute
like the one before us now would be unconstitutional only if there was 'no set of circumstances' under
which it was valid-by which it seems to mean that not a single woman in Indiana would find the law's
burdens tolerable." Id. at 707 (Wood, J., dissenting).
278. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992). As Judge Wood argued,
"Casey's discussion of the spousal notification rule makes it clear that evidence on undue burden does
not have to meet some heightened standard of perfection. To the contrary, the Court there relied on
'limited research that has been conducted... [on notifying one's husband about abortion] although
involving samples too small to be representative."' Newman, 305 F.3d at 712 (Wood, J., dissenting)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 892).
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will respond to the two-visit requirement will, of course, inevitably be "open to
debate," but it is the job of the trial court to assess the evidence in the record
and draw reasonable inferences about how Indiana women are likely to
respond.279 As Judge Wood emphasized in her dissent, the court of appeals
overstepped its bounds by riding roughshod over the reasonable inferences
drawn by the district court and "substitut[ing] its own factual assumptions for
evidence that is in the record. 280
3. Challenges to Laws Regulating the Medical Practice ofAbortion
Providers
Other post-Casey undue burden challenges have focused on state laws that
regulate the medical practices of abortion providers by laying down a variety of
requirements not imposed on comparable medical providers. 2 1  These
challenges have met with success-especially in the trial courts-more often
than challenges to waiting periods and other provisions similar to those upheld
in Casey.282 Some courts have found that these regulations do not reasonably
relate to the state's purported health interests; 283 others have found that they
279. Id. at 717. As Judge Wood noted, the Supreme Court has held that reviewing courts owe
deference to the district courts' findings of "historical fact" even in constitutional cases. Id. at 705-06
(Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) ("[A] reviewing court
should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.")); see also
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858 (1982) (reversing because "[t]he Court of
Appeals erred in setting aside findings of fact that were not clearly erroneous"); id. at 857-58 ("An
appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court simply
because the reviewing court might give the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities
differently .. ") (quotation omitted).
280. Newman, 305 F.3d at 717 (Wood, J., dissenting).
281. These laws impose a variety of special requirements on abortion providers, for example:
requiring that they be licensed; authorizing state health officials to search their offices and allowing
inspection of patients' medical records; imposing requirements as to both training and qualifications of
staff and the design and function of the physical facility; and requiring testing of patients and
employees. See Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Briefing Paper: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers:
Avoiding the "TRAP" 2-4 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/
pub.bp.avoidingthetrap.pdf. Unlike biased counseling provisions, mandatory waiting periods, parental
involvement laws, and other restrictions that seek to advance the state's interest in promoting fetal life
by influencing the woman's decision-making process, these laws regulate the medical practices of
providers in a purported effort to safeguard the pregnant woman's health. Id. at 2. Challenges to these
laws based on the right to privacy have sought to demonstrate that they are, in fact, unnecessary and
extremely burdensome, "rais[ing] the cost of providing and obtaining abortions, and thereby caus[ing]
some women to delay or even forego desired abortions." Id. at 1. These laws have also been challenged
on a variety of other federal and state constitutional law grounds, including procedural due process,
equal protection, informational privacy, and vagueness. Id. at 5-7.
282. See, e.g., Tucson Women's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004); Springfield
Healthcare Ctr. v. Nixon, No. 05-4296-CV-C-NKL (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2005) (granting a temporary
restraining order), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/crt-abjtrap.html; Jackson Women's
Health Org. v. Amy, 330 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D. Miss. 2004); Reprod. Servs. v. Keating, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23536 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 1998).
283. See, e.g., Jackson Women's Health, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (finding that Mississippi's ban on
second-trimester abortions by plaintiff-provider, "without reference to whether it meets the relevant
health and safety criteria," does not advance "the State's professed desire to protect the health and safety
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unduly burden women's access to abortion by decreasing the availability of
abortion services or increasing the costs of abortion.
284
As in the Newman litigation discussed above, however, some appellate
courts have shown a disturbing tendency to disregard trial courts' factual
findings and to impose unreasonably heavy burdens of proof on challengers.
Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant,28 5 for example, involved a challenge to a
South Carolina law that required physicians and abortion facilities that
performed more than an occasional first-trimester abortion to obtain a license to
operate their office or clinic.2 86 South Carolina did not generally require
licensing of medical facilities. 287 For abortion providers, however, licensure
was mandatory, and it was conditioned on compliance with twenty-seven pages
of detailed requirements concerning the physical layout of the facility, staff
qualifications, cleaning and maintenance of the clinic, requisite equipment,
training of staff, and the type of medical care and tests that had to be offered to
patients.288 Following a six-day bench trial and "after spending months
reviewing all aspects of this case' '289 the district court made 100 factual
findings and ultimately concluded that the regulations were invalid under
Casey.29° First, the district court found that they did not further the state's
interest in maternal health because they were "at best medically unnecessary
and at worst contrary to accepted medical practice. '291 Second, the court found
that the regulations were likely to have the effect of imposing an undue burden
on women's access to abortion in South Carolina. In assessing the burdens
posed by the regulation, the court gave great weight to evidence that the
regulation would result in a substantial rise in the cost of abortion services, "at
of women who choose abortion"); see also Tucson Women's Clinic, 379 F.3d at 540 ("[T]he undue
burden standard is not triggered at all if a purported health regulation fails to rationally promote an
interest in maternal health on its face .... ").
284. See, e.g., Springfield Healthcare Ctr., No. 05-4296-CV-C-NKL at 2 (granting a temporary
restraining order against a requirement that Missouri abortion providers have clinical privileges at a
hospital within thirty miles of where an abortion is performed because plaintiff had "demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its argument that the cessation of all abortion services
in Southwest Missouri imposes an undue burden on a woman's reproductive rights"); see also Tucson
Women's Clinic, 379 F.3d at 541 ("A significant increase in the cost of abortion or the supply of
abortion providers and clinics can, at some point, constitute a substantial obstacle to a significant
number of women choosing an abortion.").
285. 66 F. Supp. 2d 691 (D.S.C. 1999), rev'd, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1191 (2001).
286. Id. at 696. South Carolina had previously required licensing of only those offices and clinics
where second-trimester abortions were performed. Id.
287. Id. at 697.
288. See id. at 698-704.
289. Id. at 732.
290. In addition to finding that the regulation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the district court also found that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause because it "singles out physicians and clinics where abortions are performed regularly ... and
imposes upon them requirements which are not imposed upon comparable procedures and not even upon
all physicians who perform first trimester abortions." Id. at 737-43.
291. Id. at 731.
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a minimum, between $30.00 and $75.00," and, in one area of the state, would
"result in an increase of between $100 and $300, or result in the elimination of
services altogether. ' '292 The court also made specific factual findings as to how
price increases and elimination of services would likely affect women seeking
abortions in South Carolina, concluding:
By causing delays in the woman's financial ability to obtain an
abortion, the regulation will cause the woman to undergo abortion later
in the pregnancy, or forego the procedure altogether, both of which
result in a higher cost and higher medical risk for the woman. The
decreased availability of abortions due to closure of an abortion clinic
also constitutes a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions.
And increasing the distance a woman has to travel to obtain an
abortion increases the costs for the woman, again resulting in delay or
the inability to obtain an abortion.293
In a split decision reminiscent of the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Newman
discussed above, 294 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's entry of a permanent injunction, finding that the district court
had erred in its conclusions that the regulations unduly burdened women
seeking abortions and that they did not rationally further the state's purported
health interests. The court of appeals began its analysis by noting its deep
skepticism about the validity of facial challenges to abortion laws and its
reluctance to invalidate the regulation without precise evidence of its actual
impact on South Carolina women:
Because of the nature of facial challenges, [the plaintiff-providers]
could not present the district court with a concrete factual circumstance
... to which to apply the Regulation. The clinics therefore must argue
about the Regulation's impact generally and prospectively, the type of
action typically undertaken by legislatures, not courts. Because a trial
on a facial challenge can focus only on arbitrarily selected
hypotheticals to which the Regulation might apply, a court is required
to speculate about the Regulation's overall effect.
In this case, for example, the district court was not given-and
could not be given-any data from South Carolina patients about the
impact that particular costs had on their decision to seek an abortion. It
was given only estimates by "experts." Accordingly, the impact of the
Regulation in any given situation could only have been anticipated.
295
292. Id. at 735. The district court made seven detailed factual findings on the costs to providers of
complying with the regulation. See id. at 716-18. With regard to one provider, Dr. Lynn, the district
court found that "the substantial alterations that Dr. Lynn must undertake in his practice, and the
resulting extraordinary per procedure cost (even by defendants' estimate) will likely force him to cease
performing abortions in his Beaufort office and, thereby, eliminate entirely the availability of abortions
in this area of the state." Id. at 717.
293. Id. at 735.
294. See supra notes 270-280 and accompanying text.
295. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant (Greenville 1), 222 F.3d 157, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2000).
The court of appeals also indicated its strong preference for the application of the Salerno "no set of
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In rejecting the district court's findings regarding the substantial obstacles
posed by the regulation, the court of appeals emphasized that the record
contained no evidence of how the regulation "would actually affect any South
Carolina woman's decision to seek an abortion," noting that this was "not due
to a failure of proof but a problem inherent in conducting a facial challenge."
296
The court referred to the record testimony regarding cost increases as
"speculative" and, in any event, under Casey not sufficient to meet the undue
burden standard because the projected increases of twenty-three to seventy-five
dollars per abortion at two clinics, while making it more "difficult" and
"expensive" to obtain an abortion, did not impose an "undue burden on 'a
woman's ability to make the decision to have an abortion."' 297 As to the larger
projected cost increases that would cause the clinic in Beaufort, South Carolina
to shut down entirely, the court of appeals opined "no evidence suggests that
women in Beaufort could not go to the clinic in Charleston, some 70 miles
away.'298 Finally, the court of appeals balanced the degree of burden posed by
the regulation against its value in advancing the state's asserted interest,
concluding that "the increased costs claimed by the three abortion providers are
particularly modest when one considers their purpose is to protect the health of
women seeking abortions."
299
The Fourth Circuit's analysis contains several serious flaws. First, in
requiring that facial challengers support their claims with proof of a
regulation's actual impact on women in the very state that has enacted but not
implemented the regulation, the court of appeals imposed a burden that is both
insurmountable and inconsistent with Casey and Stenberg. All facial challenges
to abortion restrictions must necessarily be mounted on the basis of evidence of
an abortion restriction's likely impact, because evidence of its actual impact is
not available in a facial challenge. As discussed above, 300 Casey makes clear
that the proper focus of the undue burden analysis is whether a significant
circumstances" standard and found that the regulation would be valid under this standard. Id. at 165. The
court also assessed the regulation under the Casey standard, finding that it was valid under this standard
as well. See id.
296. Id. at 170. The court of appeals also rejected the district court's conclusions that the regulation
departed from accepted medical practice and did not further the state's interest in maternal health
because it found that some aspects of the regulation were consistent with the guidelines of national
medical organizations. Id. at 167-70.
297. Id. at 170 (quoting Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).
298. Id. The court took note of the district court's findings that the regulation would cause delays in
women's financial ability to obtain an abortion and increase travel distances, but summarily rejected
them, reiterating "again, in the context of a facial challenge and in the absence of any evidence in the
record about how the cost would affect women's ability to make a decision," the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated "any serious burden on a woman's ability to make an abortion decision." Id. at 171.
299. Id. at 170; see Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d 414, 451-52
(S.D. Tex. 1999), afd, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that the constitutionality of an abortion
regulation under Casey turns on whether "the benefits sought by the state ... justify the increased costs
that might be incurred by the physicians").
300. See supra notes 97, 107-09, 254-256 and accompanying text.
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number of women are "likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion' '3 1 and
that cost increases may constitute an undue burden if they have this effect on
women. 30 2 In contrast, by requiring evidence of the actual impact of
restrictions, the Fourth Circuit's approach effectively dooms all pre-
enforcement facial challenges-a result that is plainly at odds with the Casey
joint opinion. Second, the court of appeals erred in weighing the effects of the
regulation against the state's interest in advancing maternal health and
intimating that the benefits asserted by the state justified the burdens posed by
the regulation. The Casey joint opinion holds that even where a statute furthers
a legitimate interest of the state, it is unconstitutional if it imposes an undue
burden on women seeking abortions. 30 3 Thus, a valid state interest cannot
justify abortion laws that unduly burden women's ability to obtain an
abortion.304 Finally, as in Newman,30 5 without declaring any of the district
court's factual findings clearly erroneous, the court of appeals disregarded them
and improperly substituted its own inferences about the likely impact of the
price increases on South Carolina women. For example, it acknowledged the
district court's finding that the cost increases caused by the South Carolina
regulation would cause the closure of the only abortion provider in one area of
the state, but discounted the finding based on pure speculation that women
could easily travel seventy miles to another clinic. As Judge Hamilton noted in
his dissenting opinion, this conclusion-drawn not from the evidentiary record
but apparently from the personal life experience of the judges in the majority-
ignores the real life challenges many South Carolina women face in accessing
abortion services:
While traveling seventy miles on secondary roads may be
inconsequential to my brethren in the majority who live in the urban
sprawl of Baltimore ... such is not to be so casually addressed and
treated with cavil when considering the plight and effect on a woman
residing in rural Beaufort County, South Carolina.
30 6
301. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at 901.
303. See supra notes 80, 106 and accompanying text.
304. In repeatedly insisting that the South Carolina regulation must be shown to unduly burden a
"woman's decision to seek an abortion," Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant (Greenville 1), 222 F.3d
157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000), the court of appeals also seemed to narrow the right protected by the
Constitution. Casey and Stenberg both reaffirm that the Constitution protects both the right to decide to
choose abortion and the right to be free from substantial obstacles in implementing the abortion
decision. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (invalidating an abortion procedure ban in part
because it 'imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability' to choose a D & E abortion, thereby unduly
burdening the right to choose abortion itself.") (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874); Casey, 505 U.S. at 877
(prohibiting abortion restrictions that "plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice").
305. See supra notes 260-280 and accompanying text.
306. Greenville 1, 222 F.3d at 202 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
In contrast, the district court's findings-supported by the empirical
evidence in the record and consistent with Casey30 7-recognized that these
substantial price increases and longer travel distances would amount to a
substantial obstacle by "prevent[ing] a significant number of women from
obtaining an abortion or, at minimum, delay[ing] them from obtaining the
abortion."
30 8
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Women's
Medical Professional Corporation v. Baird30 9 provides another example of an
appellate court reversing a trial court's findings of undue burden based on
improper speculation about the impact of a regulation on women seeking
abortion. Baird, unlike Greenville, involved an as-applied challenge to an Ohio
licensing provision that required the plaintiff-abortion provider to have a
written transfer agreement with a local hospital for transfer of patients in the
event of medical complications and emergencies. 310 The abortion provider,
located in Dayton, Ohio, had tried unsuccessfully to obtain such an agreement
with local hospitals. 31 1 The district court held that applying the transfer
agreement requirement to the plaintiff-provider unduly burdened women
seeking abortions in the Dayton area because it would cause the provider,
which served 3000 women each year, to shut down completely.
312
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals reasoned that "while
closing the Dayton clinic may be burdensome for some of its potential patients,
the fact that these women may have to travel farther to obtain an abortion does
not constitute a substantial obstacle. 31 3 The court supported its conclusion by
noting that there was evidence in the record that other clinics existed in large
cities in Ohio, and that the plaintiff operated a clinic "approximately forty-five
to fifty-five miles from the Dayton clinic." 314 Therefore, the court concluded,
"potential patients of the Dayton clinic could still obtain an abortion in Ohio
and... within a reasonable distance from the Dayton clinic."
3 15
As to the trial court's finding that 3000 women per year were served by the
clinic, the court found that this fact alone "was insufficient in and of itself' to
307. The record contained testimony, credited by the district court, "that an increase ofjust $25 can
be expected to prevent one or two out of every 100 low-income women seeking an abortion from being
able to obtain one." Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 714 (D.S.C. 1999).
308. Id. at 718.
309. 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006).
310. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 277 F. Supp. 2d 862, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff'd in
part, vac'd in part, 438 F.3d 595. The district court also found that application of the transfer
requirements violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. Id. at 877-79. This aspect of the trial
court's holding was affirmed on appeal. 438 F.3d at 611 (holding that the failure to offer the provider a
pre-deprivation hearing before closing the clinic was a violation of its procedural due process rights).
311. Baird, 277 F. Supp. 2d. at 873.
312. Id. at 877.
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establish an undue burden.3 16 Rather than remanding the case to the trial court
for additional fact-findings on the impact of the closure on this large number of
women, however, the court of appeals made its own findings. The court pointed
out that "[n]inety percent of [the 3000] women come from within fifty to sixty
miles of Dayton," and "there is no evidence suggesting that a large fraction of
these women would be unable to travel to other Ohio cities for an abortion."
317
As for the other ten percent of patients that came to the Dayton clinic "from
across Ohio and from other states," the court of appeals summarily concluded:
"Presumably, the closing of the Dayton clinic would not impose an undue
burden on this population because they are already traveling to seek abortion
services."
3 18
The court used a similar analysis to reject the provider's argument,
unaddressed by the trial court, that its closure unduly burdened women seeking
late second-trimester abortion because it was "the only clinic in southern Ohio
offering abortions after the eighteenth or nineteenth week of pregnancy." 31 9 In
rejecting this argument, the court of appeals again resorted to speculation,
finding that no undue burden existed because women seeking later abortions
"could travel to Cleveland to obtain such an abortion, as clinics in that city
provide similar services to the Dayton clinic."
320
Given the critical role of fact-findings in the determination of whether a
regulation constitutes an undue burden, the Sixth Circuit's approach of
essentially making its own findings-based not on empirical evidence, but on
pure speculation-undermines the Casey standard. If the district court had not
adequately supported with factual findings its conclusion that an undue burden
existed, a fairer approach, and one more consistent with the traditional role of
an appellate court, would have been for the court of appeals to remand the case
to the district court. As the trier of fact, the district court could then assess such
factors as the availability of public transportation from Dayton to other cities in
Ohio, the cost of increased travel, the ability of other clinics in Ohio to absorb
the Dayton clinic's patients, and the ability of low-income and young women to
bear these cost increases. 32 It is essential to remove these considerations from
the realm of speculation and ground them, instead, in the empirical record if the
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 605 n.6.
319. Id. at 606.
320. Id. But see The Women's Ctr. v. Tenn. Dep't of Health, No. 3:99-0465, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20198 at *57 n.18 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 14, 2000) (finding that the plaintiff-providers had not
established that the Tennessee certificate of need requirement posed an undue burden on women seeking
abortions, but noting that had facts been presented that established that the plaintiffs treated primarily
indigent patients, that clinics in surrounding areas could not provide abortions to the women affected, or
that plaintiffs were the only clinic in their region of the state, "analysis might have been different as
well").
321. The opinion of the district court does not indicate whether the plaintiffs had, in fact, supported
their challenge with this kind of evidence.
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undue burden analysis is to meaningfilly assess whether such obstacles,
considered from the woman's perspective, are substantial ones.
4. Challenges to Abortion Procedure Bans
Even prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart,3 22 most
state abortion procedure bans were held unconstitutional under Casey.
323
Typically, these rulings have turned on the determination that the procedure
ban unduly burdens the abortion right by prohibiting common methods of pre-
viability abortion, is unconstitutionally vague, and/or makes no exception for
women whose health necessitates the banned procedure.
324
An interesting deviation from this general pattern is the ruling by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hope Clinic v. Ryan.325 In Hope Clinic,
322. See supra Part III.B.
323. Of the thirty-one states that have enacted abortion procedure bans, twenty-two have been the
subject of legal challenges. See Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Briefing Paper, supra note 14.
324. See, e.g., Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I. 1999) (granting
a permanent injunction based on vagueness, lack of health exception, and undue burden), affd, 239 F.3d
104 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming per curiam based on Stenberg); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999) (granting a permanent injunction based on findings of an unduly
burdensome purpose and effect, and lack of maternal health exception), affd, 221 F.3d 811 (5th Cir.
2000) (affirming in light of Stenberg); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, No. LR-C-97-581,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22325 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 13, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction and
declaring a procedure ban unconstitutional because of undue burden, vagueness, and absence of.health
exception), affd, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999) (basing a holding of unconstitutionality on undue burden
grounds); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (issuing a
permanent injunction against a Florida abortion procedure ban on grounds of undue burden, vagueness,
and lack of health exception); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J.
1998) (holding a procedure ban unconstitutional on grounds that it was void for vagueness, lacked a
health exception, and was unduly burdensome), affid sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v.
Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting district court's analysis, in a decision drafted but not
released prior to Stenberg decision); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, 1 F. Supp. 2d 958
(S.D. Iowa) (granting a preliminary injunction based on vagueness and undue burden), affd, 30 F. Supp.
2d 1157 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the same grounds),
affd, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the judgment based on the Eighth Circuit's Stenberg
ruling), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp.
1369 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding an Arizona procedure ban unconstitutional on grounds of undue burden,
vagueness, and failure to contain a health exception); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (granting a permanent injunction based on findings of undue burden and unconstitutional
vagueness); Women's Med. Prof l Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (enjoining a
statute based on Casey and Danforth), affd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court
based on Casey undue burden standard), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). But see Hope Clinic v.
Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 874 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a procedure ban could be applied constitutionally
but affirming a permanent injunction pending resolution of state court questions), vacated, 530 U.S.
1271 (2000) (following Stenberg).
325. 195 F.3d 857, vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000), permanent injunction entered, 249 F.3d 603
(7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam opinion holding statute unconstitutional under Stenberg). Midtown Hospital
v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1997), was also an exception to the general rule that, even
before Stenberg, procedure bans were held unconstitutional. In Midtown Hospital, the parties entered
into a consent agreement limiting Georgia's enforcement of its abortion procedure ban to intact D & E
procedures performed post-viability. In approving the consent agreement and denying the plaintiffs
motion for a temporary restraining order, the court noted that no third-trimester abortion procedures had
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the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court opinion granting a permanent
injunction under Casey.326 The district court had held that the law had the
impermissibly burdensome effect of banning common and safe pre-viability
abortion procedures. 327 In addition to finding that the law would chill
physicians' willingness to provide abortion care by criminalizing "virtually
every abortion procedure, except hysterotomy and hysterectomy, ' 328 the court
also determined that it violated the effects prong of Casey by increasing the
cost and health risk to women. 329 While the district court did not provide a
detailed purpose prong analysis, it suggested that the legislature may have acted
with an improper purpose in that it intentionally excluded a health exception,
valuing fetal survival over women's health.33 °
In a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, undertook to construe the Illinois statute and a similar
Wisconsin statute331 to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality. 332 The appeals
court acknowledged unapologetically that it was proposing a substantial
alteration in the text of the challenged provision: "if this approach would
nonetheless be an example of brute force used to save a statute-well, courts do
it all the time.'333 In another startling example of the super-proof that some
courts have demanded of plaintiffs in undue burden challenges, the appeals
court noted that plaintiffs could not point to one woman who had been injured
or denied an abortion because of a partial-birth abortion law in any state 334 _
proof that would have been challenging to produce in any event, and
particularly so when nearly every procedure ban had been enjoined prior to
implementation. Reasoning that, "[s]o long as the law does not harm women's
legitimate interests, the fact that the law's effects are small and justified by
moral rather than utilitarian considerations does not spell
unconstitutionality," 335 the Seventh Circuit upheld the statutes' constitutionality
been performed in Georgia in the last two years, and that physicians could avoid liability under the
statute by causing fetal demise prior to undertaking the banned procedure. Id. at 1362-63.
326. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (D. I11. 1998).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 857.
329. Id. at 858-59.
330. Id. at 860-61.
331. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16 (2006) (providing for life imprisonment upon conviction of offense
of performing "partial birth abortion"). The constitutionality of this statute was challenged in Planned
Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D. Wis.) (denying preliminary injunction),
rev'd, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction against the Wisconsin procedure
ban because it applied to pre-viability abortions, contained no health exception, and was
unconstitutionally vague).
332. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 865-68 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing various scenarios for
the constitutional construction of the challenged statutes, including conforming the statutory definition
of the banned procedures to the medical definition of D & X, using scienter requirements to limit
prosecutions to cases in which the defendant intends to perform all steps of a D & X procedure, and
using a common law approach to "fashion [the] outer boundaries" of the offense).
333. Id. at 865.
334. Id. at 874.
335. Id. at 875.
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in some applications. However, it left in place the injunctions preventing the
implementation of the ban against any procedure other than the D & X method
until statutory construction questions could be resolved by the state courts.
In a stinging dissent on behalf of four judges, Judge Posner argued that the
evidence indicated that the statute banned a wide range of common procedures
and would constitute an undue burden even if it could be construed to apply
only to the D & X procedure. 336 Furthermore, even if expert medical opinion
were divided on the question of whether the banned procedures are preferable
for some women, such evidence could still support a finding of undue burden:
"[T]he Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures are not entitled to ban an abortion
procedure that the medical community believes may be preferable from a
medical standpoint for some women, simply because a marginally respectable
expert... thinks that the set of women for whom the procedure is preferable is
actually zero." 337 Judge Posner detected an improper purpose both in the
statute's language, which used emotionally laden terminology designed to
discourage abortion, and in the statute's supporters, who failed to articulate a
credible purpose of the restriction other than to stigmatize abortion generally:
"[I]f a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf
is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility
to those rights, the burden is undue."
338
Despite these outlier cases, however, since Stenberg clarified that
procedure bans that sweep too broadly or lack an explicit health exception are
unconstitutional under Casey,339 courts have almost uniformly struck down
state abortion procedure bans.340 Interestingly, these cases do not generally turn
on or even undertake a purpose analysis,341 even when the challenged statute
was enacted post-Stenberg seemingly in outright defiance of the holding of that
case.342 These decisions, often per curiam, respond to the clear guidance
provided by Stenberg's per se rule that the lack of an explicit health exception
renders an abortion procedure ban unconstitutional, and sometimes also
336. Id. at 885 (Posner, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 881 (Posner, J., dissenting). This suggestion of improper purpose was echoed in Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence in Stenberg. See supra note 158.
339. See supra Part III.B.
340. See, e.g., Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon,
325 F. Supp. 2d 991 (W.D. Mo. 2004) (permanently enjoining procedure ban based on Stenberg), affd,
429 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming on health exception grounds); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women
v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2004) (granting a permanent injunction against a 2003 ban on
"partial birth infanticide," VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2006), on grounds that the statute lacked a
health exception, was vague, and imposed an unduly burdensome effect on pre-viability abortions),
affd, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court under Stenberg based on absence of
health exception), pet. for cert.filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2005) (No. 05-730).
341. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
342. See, e.g., Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499; Nixon, 325 F. Supp. 2d 991 (holding a post-Stenberg
procedure ban, MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300 (2004), unconstitutional because it lacked a health
exception).
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undertake an undue burden analysis that focuses on the unconstitutional effect
that a ban on most second-trimester abortion methods would have on women's
access to abortion.
343
The consistency achieved in this body of case law is due to the clarity of
the Stenberg majority opinion. With three ongoing challenges to the federal
Abortion Procedure Ban344 likely to produce additional guidance from the
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of procedure bans, it is essential that the
Court reaffirm the primacy of women's health central to the Court's Stenberg
ruling and to those earlier cases from which Stenberg proceeded: Casey,
Danforth, and Roe.
B. Implementation of the Purpose Prong
Given the heavy burden of proving in a facial challenge that abortion
restrictions will have an actual impermissible effect on women's access to
abortion, the purpose prong of Casey's undue burden test becomes especially
useful, because evidence of improper purpose is likely to be available pre-
implementation, whereas proof of impermissible effect might not be. Yet, just
as lower federal courts have often failed to conduct a contextualized, fact-
sensitive analysis of the specific effects of an abortion regulation on the
affected classes of women, so too have they often failed to look searchingly at
the legislative purpose motivating the enactment of challenged restrictions.
Similarly, some appellate courts have disregarded district courts' fact-finding
as regards legislative purpose, substituting their own presumptions and drawing
their own inferences in the absence of any finding of clear error, thus repeating
the methodological mistake of imposing Casey's result instead of applying
Casey's standard.
Since the Court's perplexing suggestion in Mazurek that an impermissible
legislative purpose to pose a substantial obstacle to abortion might only be
inferred if the intended obstruction has actually been created,345 the Supreme
Court has offered little additional guidance as to how to approach Casey's
purpose prong.346 Lower courts have tended to omit discussion of the purpose
343. In contrast, in Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003), the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit lifted a district court injunction entered post-Stenberg that had
enjoined Ohio's abortion procedure ban on the ground that it lacked an adequate health exception. In
permitting the ban to take effect, the appeals court distinguished Stenberg by pointing to the Ohio
statute's careful description of the restricted procedure, to the statute's specific exclusion of the D & E
procedure, and to the presence of a health exception.
344. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part III.A.
346. See Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion Providers: A
New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1586 (2005) (concluding that the Supreme
Court has largely ignored the purpose prong of the undue burden test, and noting Justice Thomas's
comment in dissenting in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1008 n.19 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
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prong or to conflate it with the effects prong.34 7 The lower court cases that have
addressed the purpose prong as an independent constitutional basis for
invalidating abortion restrictions have tended to define the test negatively,
describing the type of evidence that is insufficient to establish improper
purpose but never indicating what evidence, short of a defendant's outright
admission on the record, might suffice. 34 8 Absent such an admission, lower
courts have been extremely reluctant to apply the purpose prong to invalidate
abortion restrictions. 349 In the words of one district court, "[a]fter [Mazurek],
the impermissible purpose prong of the undue burden test appears almost
,,350impossible to prove ....
The lower courts' reluctance to engage in meaningful purpose prong
analysis is at least partly traceable to the Casey Court's reticence on the subject.
For example, in Karlin v. Foust, where plaintiffs produced detailed evidence of
improper purpose focusing on the statute's legislative history, the district court
reluctantly rejected the purpose prong challenge, relying principally not on the
recently decided Mazurek, but on Casey.351 In Karlin, a group of women's
health care providers challenged Wisconsin's restrictive abortion statute which
was based loosely on the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.3 52 It contained a
twenty-four-hour waiting period and biased counseling provisions even more
extensive than those in Casey,353 though certain provisions also contained
that the Court would require "persuasive proof' before concluding that a legislature had acted with an
unconstitutional intent).
347. See supra notes 341-342 and accompanying text.
348. Defendant-Appellees in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
Leavitt v. Jane L., 520 U.S. 1274 (1997), made just such an admission. Jane L. concerned a Utah statute
sharply restricting abortions after twenty weeks' gestation. The court of appeals struck down the statute,
concluding that the legislature had acted with an improper motive by drafting a statute in direct conflict
with Supreme Court precedent in order to provoke a challenge to Roe, as evidenced by the legislature's
creation of an abortion litigation trust account. During litigation, the state conceded that its purpose was
to restrict abortions, raising no defense that any member of the Utah legislature had acted with a
permissible purpose. See also Karlin, 188 F.3d at 493 (purpose prong "challenge will rarely be
successful, absent some sort of explicit indication from the state that it was acting in furtherance of an
improper purpose.").
349. Our research revealed only three cases striking down an abortion restriction on the basis of
improper purpose: Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (terminating tort liability for
abortion providers), rev'd on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997) (removing a certificate of need
requirement); and Jane L., 102 F.3d 1112 (eliminating post-20-week abortion restrictions).
350. Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1210 (W.D. Wis. 1997), affd, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.
1999).
351. Karlin, 975 F. Supp. 1177.
352. Id.; Assembly Bill 441, codified at Wis. STAT. 253.10 (2005).
353. Among the more onerous aspects of the Wisconsin statute w re: a requirement that the
mandated counseling be given in person by the physician or any other "qualified physician"; that the
woman's gestational stage be provided to her orally and in writing; that the physician discuss with the
woman a specific list of possible risks of abortion including infection, psychological trauma,
hemorrhage, endometritis, perforated uterus, incomplete abortion, failed abortion, danger to subsequent
pregnancies, and infertility, as well as "any other information that a reasonable patient would consider
material and relevant to a decision of whether or not to carry a child to birth or to undergo an abortion";
that the physician inform the woman that fetal ultrasound imaging and auscultation of fetal heart beat
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narrow exceptions of questionable utility that were not present in the
Pennsylvania law. 354 Notably, the statute did not contain Pennsylvania's health
exception permitting doctors to omit informed consent information that would
''result in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the
patient."
355
The Karlin court undertook an extensive discussion of the Casey standard,
including its purpose prong.356 Starting with the observation that "[t]he Court's
application of the test to the Pennsylvania statute at issue sheds some light on
the meaning of the test,"357 the district court noted that the Casey joint opinion
"did not subject the Pennsylvania law to a searching purpose inquiry., 358 The
Karlin court drew a lesson from this silence: "The absence of any detailed
discussion of the purpose prong of the undue burden test in Casey signals the
considerable difficulty of mounting a credible challenge to an abortion law on
the premise that the law harbors an impermissible purpose, even if the law's
provisions are medically unnecessary."
359
The district court is somewhat critical of the Supreme Court's inadequate
guidance on this point, and gamely attempts to fill in the blanks. Ultimately,
however, the district court imputes the Supreme Court's silence to a tacit
conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to make their purpose case, noting that
"[n]one of the Pennsylvania regulations was invalidated because of an invalid
purpose. ' 36° The district court makes the further logical error of concluding
that, because the Pennsylvania statute did not have an impermissible purpose,
therefore the Wisconsin statute also did not: "Moreover, the Supreme Court
services are available and how to obtain them; and that the woman be provided with the name and phone
number of a physician to call following the procedure should she experience any complications. See
WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)1 (2005). In addition, like the Pennsylvania statute on which it was modeled,
the Wisconsin statute directed the publication of printed materials describing fetal development and
listing agencies offering assistance to women continuing their pregnancies; unlike the Pennsylvania law,
however, Wisconsin required that the provider "physically give" the woman these printed materials. See
id. § 253.10(3)(c)2.d. To add insult to injury, the providers could be charged a fee for them. See id. §§
253.10(3)(d), 46.245.
354. For example, the twenty-four-hour waiting period could be waived if the woman seeking
abortion care alleged that she was the victim of sexual assault which she had reported to law
enforcement authorities, and the provider had verified that the report had been made. See id. §
253.10(3m)(a). Applying a somewhat tougher rule for incest survivors, the waiting period could be
reduced to two hours but not waived if a woman or child alleged that she had survived an act of incest
and had reported it to law enforcement authorities, and her provider had verified that the report had been
made. See id. § 253.10(3m)(b).
355. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(c) (West 2000).
356. Karlin, 975 F. Supp. 1177.
357. Id. at 1199-1200.
358. Id. at 1208.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1204. As explained above, the Casey plaintiffs had had no opportunity to produce proof
of legislative purpose, as such evidence would have been unnecessary, if not irrelevant, to the governing
strict scrutiny standard in effect at the time. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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reviewed similar provisions in the Pennsylvania law and did not find that they
revealed an impermissible legislative purpose."
36 1
Were Casey not binding, I might be inclined to hold that AB 441 was
passed with an impermissible purpose, given the absence of any
apparent medical benefits in the new legislation, the acknowledgment
of Dr. Gianopoulos that the previous law adequately informed women
about the risks of abortion, the imposition of a two-trip requirement
that will greatly increase the cost and difficulty of obtaining an
abortion and make women far more vulnerable to harassment by anti-
abortion protesters, and the evident effort of the legislature to impose
requirements on physicians that will reduce the number of abortions
they can perform, increase their risk of being sued or losing their
licenses and add to the expenses of their practices. However, lower
courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent. I do not see how Casey
does not control this question.
362
With the same uncritical reflex that characterizes many lower courts' effects
analysis, the Karlin court dismissed the plaintiffs' evidence that anti-abortion
groups were heavily involved in the development and passage of the abortion
restrictions, transforming Mazurek's particularized holding that the evidence in
that case was insufficient to prove improper legislative purpose31 3 into a hard-
and-fast rule that "the involvement of anti-abortion groups in drafting
legislation has no relevance to the legislature's purpose.
' 364
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district
court's purpose prong analysis, 365 noting that, "[a]bsent some evidence
demonstrating that the stated purpose is pretextual, our inquiry into the
legislative purpose is necessarily deferential and limited. ' 36 6 Like the district
court, the appeals court read Casey and Mazurek to suggest that "such a
challenge will rarely be successful, absent some sort of explicit indication from
the state that it was acting in furtherance of an improper purpose.' '367 Because
Casey "accepted at face value" the state's proffered legislative purposes and
did not "scrutinize too closely" the intent underlying the challenged
Pennsylvania provisions,368 the Seventh Circuit simply accepted Wisconsin's
asserted purposes. In doing so, the appeals court dismissed the proof of
361. Id. at 1212.
362. Id.
363. See supra Part I.A.
364. Karlin, 975 F. Supp. at 1211. This error was repeated in other cases. For example, in Women's
Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a licensing statute was facially neutral because it applied to all health care facilities,
rejecting evidence of improper purpose in the lobbying campaign conducted by anti-abortion activists
trying to deny the providers a license, despite a district court finding that the director had been actually
affected by this political pressure. Reasoning that no improper purpose could be found where the
department had granted licenses to other abortion providers, the appeals court upheld the statute.
365. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
366. Id. at 496.
367. Id. at 493.
368. Id.
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improper purpose adduced at trial,369 including the trial court's finding of an
"evident effort of the legislature to impose requirements on physicians that will
reduce the number of abortions they can perform, increase their risk of being
sued or losing their licenses and add to the expenses of their practices."
370
Ignoring the trial court's finding of the legislature's "evident effort" to impede
abortion services, the appeals court chastised the plaintiffs for failing to "come
forward with some evidence of unconstitutional intent or purpose especially
when the legislature has otherwise identified permissible purposes in enacting
the legislation being challenged. 37 1
Similar analytical errors can be found in appeals courts' reversals of lower
courts' application of the purpose prong. In Greenville Women's Clinic v.
Bryant, discussed above,372 the district court found an improper purpose based
upon the rushed legislative process that provided "no meaningful inquiry" into
appropriate regulations for an abortion clinic, leading to many unnecessary and
burdensome requirements. 373 The finding of improper purpose was based in
part on Casey's admonition that improper purpose may be inferred where "a
requirement[] serves no purpose other than to make abortions more
difficult." 374 Here, the district court found no evidence that the onerous
regulation was needed or that the restrictions advanced their asserted
purpose. 375 Credible testimony had established that the state was not
experiencing a public health crisis, and that there was no indication that
abortion providers were dispensing unsanitary or inadequate care.376 On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this ruling and
upheld the statute, reasoning that "there is no requirement that a state refrain
from regulating abortion facilities until a public-health problem manifests
itself.,
3 77
369. Id. at 496.
370. Karlin, 975 F. Supp. at 1211 (emphasis added).
371. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 496.
372. Supra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
373. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705-10 (D.S.C. 1999).
374. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
375. Greenville Women's Clinic, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
376. Id.; see also id. at 715 (finding testimony credible).
377. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 152, 169 (4th Cir. 2000). Similarly, in A
Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1463-66 (S.D. Ind. 1995),
discussed supra notes 260-280 and accompanying text, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction after examining the legislative history of the challenged statute, including records
of the legislative debate. In light of that debate, the court expressed skepticism that the state's asserted
purpose in enacting a requirement that informed consent counseling be provided in the presence of the
pregnant woman-to deter telephonic impersonation of health care providers-was genuine. Even so,
the court was unwilling to base its ruling on a purpose prong analysis, noting the difficulty in
determining the subjective motives of state legislators and ruling instead on the basis of the statute's
unduly burdensome effects. Following a ruling from the state courts answering certified questions
regarding the "in the presence" requirement, A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman,
671 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. 1996), the Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the
plaintiffs based on the effects prong, disregarding the district court's concerns about the apparently
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Not every court, however, has given the purpose prong such short shrift.
Other courts have read Mazurek and Casey to require an individualized
assessment of the totality of circumstances revealing legislative purpose. In
Okpalobi v. Foster,378 a challenge to Act 825, a Louisiana statute broadly
creating tort liability for medical professionals providing abortion care, 379 the
district court expressed suspicion of the state's asserted purpose of ensuring
that abortion providers obtain informed consent. The court questioned why the
state would not simply strengthen the preexisting informed consent statute.
380
Determining that the statute's purpose and effect were to impose a substantial
obstacle to abortion, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction.
38 1
On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit looked carefully at Mazurek and
Casey and concluded that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional based in part
on its improper purpose. 382 The court noted that, under Casey and Fifth Circuit
precedent applying Casey, the purpose prong inquiry should not be conflated
with the inquiry into the effects prong, but should be independently
analyzed.38 3 Looking closely at the discussion of legislative purpose evidence
in Jane L.384 and Mazurek,385 the appeals court understood these cases to
"reconfirm that the established methods for assaying a legislature's purpose are
valid in the abortion context. 386 Mazurek merely rejected two types of
evidence as insufficient proof that the legislature acted with a forbidden
motive-medical data showing that nonphysicians could safely perform
abortions and evidence that anti-abortion groups lobbied for the challenged
statute.387 Similarly, Jane L. relied not only on the state's admission of
improper purpose, but also on the evidently improper purpose revealed on the
face of the statute. 388 Declining to read either decision as support for the
sweeping proposition that an improper purpose cannot be established absent a
party's admission, or that the statutory language, legislative history and
context, and related legislation are irrelevant, the appeals court turned to the
task of determining what evidence of improper purpose to consider.
389
improper purpose of the statute. A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684,
693 (7th Cir. 2002).
378. 981 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1998), afi'd, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'don other grounds,
244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
379. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.11 (redesignated as § 9:2800.12) (2006).
380. Okpalobi, 981 F. Supp. at 983.
381. Id. at 986-88.
382. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 357.
383. Id. at 354 ("As the ... test for undue burden is disjunctive, a determination that either the
purpose or the effect of the Act creates such an obstacle is fatal.") (discussing Casey and Sojourner T. v.
Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992)).
384. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996).
385. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); see supra Part M.A.
386. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 356.
387. Id. at 355.
388. Id. at 356.
389. Idat 355-56.
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Like other courts, the Okpalobi appeals court commented that Casey gave
"little, if any" guidance on how to conduct a purpose prong inquiry.
390
However, the appeals court found ample guidance in constitutional case law
from other contexts, specifically, voting rights and Establishment Clause
cases.39 1 In these cases, which included Edwards v. 4guillard, Stone v.
Graham,393 and Shaw v. Hunt,394 it was proper for courts to give significant
deference to "a government's articulation of legislative purpose." 395 However,
as Edwards and Stone emphasized, that purpose had to be more than a "mere
'sham."' 396 Following this body of precedent, the court determined that "the
language of the challenged act, its legislative history, the social and historical
context of the legislation, or other legislation concerning the same subject
matter as the challenged measure" all constituted relevant evidence of
legislative purpose.
397
In applying this analytical method to Act 825, the court found evidence of
improper purpose in the language of the challenged provision. The state's
asserted purpose was to inform the woman's choice and to ensure that
physicians shared information about the risks of abortion with their patients.
398
However, the "plain language" and the structure of the Act refuted these
assertions, because the statute created a tort cause of action, and informed
consent was only included in the statute as a way of reducing damages, not
avoiding liability.399 Reading the Act in conjunction with the state's informed
consent law, the court concluded, "it is undeniable that the provision is
designed not to supplement the Woman's Right to Know Act, but to ensure that
a physician cannot insulate himself from liability by advising a woman of the
risks.., associated with abortion."40 0 Acknowledging that the deference that
courts owe to state legislation might have presented a close question had the
statute's only constitutional infirmity been its improper purpose, the appeals
court determined that the statute's effect would also have been to impose an
undue burden, and accordingly enjoined the Act.40 1 The ruling was short-lived,
as the court of appeals sitting en banc subsequently vacated the judgment on
390. Id. at 354.
391. See Metzger, supra note 29, at 2072-77 (discussing the Establishment Clause endorsement test
as a useful method for applying the undue burden standard).
392. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
393. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
394. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
395. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 354.
396. Id. (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87, and citing Stone, 449 U.S. at 41).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 356.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 357.
401. Id.
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402
other grounds. Still, the Okpalobi appellate decision stands as a model for
purpose prong analysis, and a clear example of the vitality that this test retains.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Planned
Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Atchison 4 3 provides a final example of the
careful application of the purpose prong. In Atchison, the district court had
closely scrutinized the motives of the Iowa Department of Health in applying
its certificate-of-need law 4 04 to abortion providers but not to other outpatient
medical providers. 40 5 The evidence in the record revealed that an anti-abortion
lobbying campaign had targeted the clinic at issue in the case, 4 0 6 and that, "in
the ten years preceding this case, no similarly structured outpatient clinic had
been required to obtain a certificate of need before opening for business.
' 4 °7
Unlike the Karlin40 8 and Baird40 9 courts, the Eighth Circuit did not conclude
that evidence of anti-abortion lobbying groups' involvement in the formulation
of a challenged policy can never have any probative value in evaluating
impermissible intent. The appeals court clarified that, although the anti-
abortion lobby's advocacy for a review of the proposed clinic did not constitute
evidence of improper purpose, the state's response to that lobbying campaign
did.4 10 The court of appeals refused to disturb the district court's finding of
improper purpose based on the Department's apparent motive-to prevent a
particular provider from operating-and on the social and historical context of
the applied restriction.11 In enjoining the application of the certificate of need
requirement to Planned Parenthood, the court of appeals quoted Casey's
admonition that, "where a requirement serves no purpose other than to make
abortions more difficult, it strikes at the heart of a protected right, and is an
unconstitutional burden on that right.
4 12
Perhaps the Okpalobi and Atchison plaintiffs succeeded in establishing
improper purpose in part because the provisions at issue-a tort liability statute
402. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over claims against defendants who lacked enforcement
authority over challenged statute).
403. 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997).
404. Under section 135.63(1) of the Iowa Code, prior to offering any new institutional health
service, a provider must obtain a "certificate of need" from the Department of Health following a public
hearing process in which the clinic must prove that its services are needed, economical, and not merely
duplicative of existing medical facilities' services. IOWA CODE § 135.63(1) (2005). In applying this
provision to abortion providers, the Department of Health gave opponents of abortion a mechanism for
blocking new clinics. Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044.
405. Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1046.
406. Id. at 1044.
407. Id. at 1046.
408. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999); see supra notes 350-371 and accompanying
text.
409. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006); see supra notes 309-321
and accompanying text.
410. Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1049.
411. Id.
412. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
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and a certificate of need requirement-had no counterparts in the legislation
challenged in Casey, thus facilitating a fresh look at the challenged provisions.
Regardless of whether or not abortion restrictions mirror the Pennsylvania
restrictions in Casey, however, the individualized assessment of the totality of
circumstances revealing legislative purpose undertaken by the Okpalobi and
Atchison appellate courts indicates that the purpose prong can indeed provide
the basis of a viable undue burden challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
In the coming terms, the Roberts Court will undoubtedly have ample
occasion to consider the scope of constitutional protection for abortion and to
clarify the contours of the undue burden standard. The Casey Court retreated
from Roe's high level of protection. However, its broad articulation of the
undue burden standard, the joint opinion's application of that standard to strike
down Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement, and its emphasis on
women's equality promised meaningful protection for women's abortion rights.
Some post-Casey lower court decisions demonstrate that, if fairly and correctly
applied, the undue burden standard can provide a reasonable measure of
protection for women's right to choose abortion. Other lower federal courts,
however, have misconstrued and misapplied the undue burden standard,
thereby seriously weakening it. As discussed in Part IV, the analytical errors
committed in some of these cases have included: (1) imposing unattainable
evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs; (2) reflexively sustaining the constitutionality
of restrictions similar to those upheld in Casey, despite a different and stronger
factual record of burdensome effect; (3) scrutinizing the effect of an abortion
regulation in isolation from other restrictions that compound its burdensome
impact; (4) evaluating the impact of restrictions from the point of view of the
privileged, rather than contextualizing the burden within the realities of
affected women's lives; (5) at the appellate level, discounting trial courts'
factual findings in favor of the appeals court's own assumptions and inferences;
and (6) requiring an admission by defendants of improper purpose, or requiring
proof that not a single legislator acted with a permissible purpose, or excising
the purpose prong from the undue burden test altogether. These decisions
illustrate the clear danger that, if not corrected by the Court, the undue burden
standard can be manipulated so as to substantially undermine Roe's core
protections, whether or not Casey is explicitly overruled.
If the undue burden standard is to remain in place and if it is to fulfill
Casey's promise that "the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate
to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but
2006]
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not in fact,' 4 13 then the Court should provide the guidance for which this body
of case law cries out. Pre-enforcement facial challenges to restrictive abortion
laws must be permitted to proceed without being doomed from the outset by
evidentiary hurdles that are virtually impossible to meet. In this regard, the
Supreme Court must make explicit what is implicit in Casey, Stenberg, and
Ayotte: Facial challengers need not meet Salerno's tough evidentiary burden of
showing that there exists "no set of circumstances" under which the law can
414validly be applied. Rather, as Casey instructs, challengers must establish that,
"in a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant, [the law] will operate
as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.
4 15
Furthermore, in applying Casey's undue burden standard, the Court must
clarify that the proper focus is whether a given restriction is likely to pose a
substantial obstacle to those women for whom the restriction is relevant, and
that litigants need not meet the heightened standard of perfection-requiring
proof not "open to debate" of how the law is bound to affect women-imposed
by the Seventh Circuit in Newman4 16 and suggested by the Fourth Circuit in
Greenville.
417
Moreover, in assessing the evidentiary record to determine an abortion
law's potential impact, lower courts have too often failed to conduct a
contextualized, fact-sensitive analysis of its likely impact on women, resulting
in shallow, even dismissive treatment of the realities of women's lives. Such
cursory treatment is not how the Casey Court applied the undue burden
standard to the husband-notification provision, the only provision with a truly
well-developed factual record, and it is not how the Stenberg Court analyzed
restrictions on abortion methods that had the potential to harm women. The
Court must clarify that lower courts must conduct a full review of the
evidentiary record to measure the impact of all abortion restrictions-including
those similar to ones upheld in Casey--to determine whether they pose a
substantial obstacle to women. This assessment must incorporate the
perspective of the women and girls actually affected by these laws. If the undue
burden standard is to provide meaningful protection, courts must acknowledge
the current real life challenges of poverty, violence, youth, and geography that
make access to abortion very difficult for some women, and give careful
consideration to the ways in which an abortion restriction, operating with
others, can exploit and exacerbate those difficulties to the point that access to
abortion is effectively denied. These assessments must be grounded in the
413. Id. at 872.
414. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
415. Casey, 505 U. S. at 895.
416. A Woman's Choice-E. Side Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2002); see supra
notes 260-280 and accompanying text.
417. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant (Greenville 1), 222 F.3d 157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000); see
supra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary records before courts. As the decisions discussed in Part IV
illustrate, when courts base conclusions on pure speculation disconnected from
the record evidence of the realities of women's lives, they inevitably minimize
and discount the impact of challenged restrictions, viewing them as mere
inconveniences rather than the insurmountable obstacles they are for those
women for whom the restriction is relevant.
4 18
The Supreme Court must also dispel the confusion it created in Mazurek by
clarifying the types of evidence that would support a determination of improper
purpose. Specifically, the Court should confirm that "the language of the
challenged act, its legislative history, the social and historical context of the
legislation, or other legislation concerning the same subject matter as the
challenged measure" all constitute relevant evidence of legislative purpose.
4 19
In addition, the Court should reaffirm that, consistent with Casey, a finding that
a legislature enacted an abortion restriction for the purpose of imposing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking abortion is, in and of itself,
sufficient to render that restriction unconstitutional.
Our research reveals a troubling tendency of appellate courts to disregard
the factual findings of district courts and to substitute their own presumptions
in the absence of any finding of clear error. In doing so, these courts undermine
the undue burden standard by divesting the trial courts of their authority, as
triers of fact, to assess whether a challenged regulation will impose a
substantial obstacle. The Supreme Court must admonish appellate courts to
give appropriate deference to the factual findings and inferences of improper
purpose or effect drawn by trial courts.
Finally, the Supreme Court's upcoming review of lower court decisions
striking down the federal abortion procedure ban provides it with an
opportunity to reaffirm its steadfast insistence-clarified and strengthened in
post-Casey decisions over a decade and a half-that abortion restrictions must
never damage women's health. To vindicate this principle, unquestionably at
the core of the right recognized in Roe, the undue burden standard must be
clarified and reinvigorated so that the promise of Casey is realized in
meaningful protection for women.
418. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
419. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
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